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EXAMINATION OF EXPENSE AND INVESTMENT  
POLICY FOR CENTRALLY MANAGED ITEMS  




A basic principle of fiscal law is the identification of an object of expenditure as 
either an investment or expense; the identification then determines the proper 
appropriation and means through which the item is acquired. Part of the decision logic for 
an investment/expense determination is whether the items are centrally managed. The 
policies and practices surrounding central management of items varies across military 
departments and sometimes varies within a military department. This report documents 
various processes, as they exist today, and chronicles changes that occurred recently in 
the U.S. Air Force. Analyzing those processes indicates unclear policy direction, which 
leads to nonstandard implementation and problems with compliance. The presence of 
centralized information technology seems to lessen confusion and aid standardization of 
practices. Recommendations are offered for policy makers who may be considering 
changing policies.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The Department of the Navy (DoN) suffered four Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) 
violations in the last five years related to the procurement of centrally managed items and 
is considering options for adjusting their policies. This research project assesses Navy 
and other military departments' policies concerning central management of items. 
Centrally managed items below the Department of Defense (DoD) Financial 
Management Regulations (FMR) expense/investment threshold is the focus of this 
project. 
The primary purpose of this research project is to examine and identify policies, 
practices, and problems with centrally managed items in the Department of the Navy, 
United States Marine Corps, and the United States Air Force, to answer the research 
question: can the DoN improve the way assets are centrally managed based on lessons 
learned from the Air Force decentralization model? 
The benefits of this research come from the application of lessons learned from 
the Air Force decentralization model, if the DoN decides to change its policy on centrally 
managed items. DoN can then avoid mistakes made by the Air Force and reduce the 
learning curve of transitioning to new policies and practices based on these lessons 
learned from the Air Force. 
B. SCOPE 
The scope of this project is limited to the DoD only, and more specifically, the 
DoN, the United States Marine Corps, and the United States Air Force. This research 
focuses on, but is not limited to, financial and supply policies concerning expense, 
investment, and centrally managed items in these three services. Interviews with officials 
in these three services were conducted to solicit opinions and determine day-to-day 
practice and problems associated with centrally managed items. The intent of this project 
was not to craft a new Navy policy on centrally managed items, but rather to document 
and identify the existing processes in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force to make 
 2
recommendations to DoN. The research is limited to the information found through 
exhaustive research and opinions and information provided by the officials interviewed. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The primary source of data collection for this study was through personal 
interviews with various Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force officials assigned to 
acquisition, budget, financial management, operations, and material command positions 
in the DoD. All persons interviewed were assured anonymity, and therefore, the project 
does not cite them specifically. The remainder of data was collected through the review 
of numerous DoD and service specific publications, historical documents, scholarly 
articles, government reports and other related research papers and articles. 
Once the data were collected, the authors discovered common systemic problems 
in each of the services. The data were analyzed by focusing on problems associated with 
centrally managed items to make recommendations to FMB-5 based on lessons learned 
from these organizations reviewed; specifically, what lessons can be learned from the Air 
Force transition from a centralized model, to a decentralized model, and back to a new 
and improved centralized model. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II provides a background and examination of the DoD FMR expense and 
investment cost determination. If expenses and investments are incorrectly identified, one 
of the most severe consequences is an Anti-Deficiency Act Violation (ADA). The 
history, definition, and trends associated with ADA violations are examined, and why 
these are important to the research question. Then, the definition and differences between 
policy and law are studied and what controls are in place concerning them. Chapter II 
concludes with methodology for data collection and analysis. 
Chapter III is a presentation and discussion of the data collected from revision of 
policies, orders, and interviews with officials from service components. Data from the 
United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, and the United States Air Force were  
 
 3
collected. Data are presented and analyzed in terms of policy, guidance, areas of concern, 
and effective and ineffective practices. The analysis discusses advantages and 
disadvantages of how some services have attempted to address these issues. 
Chapter IV provides the overview of general policy in relation to the DoD and 
shows how this research is an example. This chapter concludes with the research findings 
and recommendations to answer the research question posed in Chapter I. The lessons 
learned from Chapter III are also summarized and the limitations for this type of thesis 
research are explained. Finally, suggestions are presented for further study, which are 
useful to help resolve problems associated with centrally managed items. 
 4
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II. BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY 
The DoD FMR defines whether equipment requires the use of expense funding or 
investment funding. Chapter II gives a background on the DoD FMR and on expense and 
investment funding determination. If expenses and investments are incorrectly identified, 
one of the most severe consequences is an Anti-Deficiency Act Violation (ADA). The 
history, definition, and trends associated with ADA violations are examined, and why 
this is important to the research question. Then, the definition and differences between 
policy and law are studied and what controls are in place concerning them. The chapter 
concludes with methodology for data collection and analysis. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Expense costs are defined in general terms as those that are “incurred to operate 
and maintain the organization, such as personal services, supplies, and utilities” (DoD 
FMR, Vol. 2A, p. 1-13). Investment costs are defined as those “that result in the 
acquisition of, or an addition to, end items” and “benefit future periods and generally are 
of a long-term character, such as real property and personal property” (DoD FMR, Vol. 
2A, p. 1-13). The DoD FMR also provides guidelines for both expense and investment 
costs by listing specific costs under each category. For example, it lists civilian labor, 
food, clothing, and fuel as expense type items, and ammunition and explosives as 
investment type items. While costs budgeted under the Operation and Maintenance 
(O&M) and Military Personnel appropriations are considered expenses, costs budgeted 
under the Procurement and Military Construction appropriations are considered 
investments (DoD FMR, Vol. 2A, p. 1-13). 
The DoD FMR also provides a visual guide, in the form of a decision tree, to aid 
users in distinguishing an expense item from an investment item, shown in Table 1. The 
first block of the figure introduces another category called a “centrally managed/asset 




Expense/Investment Cost Determination  
Is the item a  If  Then  If  Then  If  Then  
Yes  Classify as 
Investment  
Yes Is the item part of 
a full funding 




Controlled Item?  




No  Classify as 
Investment  
Yes Classify as 
Investment  




No  Classify as 
Expense  
* When intended for use in weapon system outfitting, government furnished material on 
new procurement contracts or for installation as part of a weapon as part of a weapon 
system modification, major reactivation or major service life extension.  
Table 1.   Expense/Investment Cost Determination (From: DoD FMR, Vol. 2A, 
Chapter 1, October 2008, p. 1-18) 
Trying to follow the decision tree can be confusing. For example, if the answer to 
the first question of whether an item is centrally managed is “no,” then the next question 
is, is the unit cost greater than $250,000? If the answer to this second question is “yes,” 
then the item can be classified as an investment item. If the answer to the “greater than 
$250,000” is “no,” then the item is classified as an expense item. On the other hand, if the 
answer to the first question of whether or not the item is centrally managed is “yes,” the 
next question is whether the item is to be purchased from the Defense Working Capital 
Fund (DWCF). If the answer to this is “no,” the investment classification is then selected, 
but if the answer is “yes,” one last question needs to be asked, is the funding part of a full 
funding effort? If “yes,” then select investment. If “no,” then select expense. 
Several opportunities exist for when a user can go wrong. If the user chooses 
“yes” when it really should be “no,” at any point in the figure, the user could classify and 
item as an “expense” when it should be an “investment.” The greater the number of 
contingencies, which exist, the greater the potential mistakes made when classifying 
items as expense or investment items. The FMR does not explain the terms used in the 
questions very well. The answers to the questions may seem easy, but they are not 
intuitive to a novice user who is uninformed or unclear about the DoD or the component 
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services’ financial policies and terms. Terms, such as “centrally managed,” “controlled 
item,” “DWCF,” and “full funding effort” must be understood, otherwise, the figure does 
not assist users in the manner it was intended. A misunderstanding of any of these key 
terms can also lead to mistakes of funding, when the wrong appropriation is used based 
on the classification of an expense as an investment, or vice versa. This project focuses 
on the term “centrally managed” theme, the issues and pitfalls related to this term, and 
provides recommendations to prevent mistakes when dealing with centrally managed 
items. 
The DoD FMR does not indicate which items should be centrally managed by 
each service. It leaves that discretion to each individual service. The Navy and Marine 
Corps choose to manage and procure certain items centrally to take advantage of 
economies of scale, ensure interoperability, and prevent fraud, waste and abuse. 
Examples of centrally managed items include items, such as ships, aircraft, military 
vehicles, commercial vehicles, and weapons. Most investment items are durable major 
end items, which have a long service life. In the Navy, centrally managed items are 
funded with procurement dollars regardless of dollar value. Most expense items are 
consumables, which are less durable, and have a short service life, so they are funded 
with O&M dollars. 
Certain items, such as forklifts and computers, are investment items, which cost 
less than $250,000, but are centrally managed, must be funded with procurement dollars. 
Not funding these items with procurement dollars can lead to fiscal law violations. In the 
past, the Navy has had Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) violations due to lower echelon 
commands purchasing centrally managed items with O&M funds when the items should 
have been purchased with procurement dollars. While most commands clearly understand 
that certain items, such as major weapon systems are centrally managed, this is not clear 
when it comes to other items, such as generators and runway sweepers, which are 
centrally managed and cost less than $250,000. 
Six years ago, the Air Force decentralized the management of certain items and 
moved funding of these items from procurement to O&M funds. This action shifted 
authority and responsibility over previously centralized items to lower echelon 
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commands, making lower echelon commands responsible for the formulation and 
execution of these funds. This change may have resolved some issues the Air Force was 
facing to include the prevention of more ADA violations since the lower echelon units 
affected no longer had to determine whether an item was centrally managed or not. Yet, it 
also created unintended consequences due to the increased flexibility and much less 
control over the funding, execution, and tracking of the previously centrally managed 
items. Therefore, the research question posed is the following. Can the Department of the 
Navy improve the way assets are centrally managed based on lessons learned from the 
Air Force decentralization model?  
It is important to the Navy to minimize problems associated with centrally 
managed items, reduce the potential for ADA violations, and to clarify the current policy 
on centrally managed items. 
B. ANTI-DEFICIENCY ACT VIOLATIONS 
1. Defining the Anti-Deficiency Act 
“The Anti-Deficiency Act is actually a series of laws whose objective is to bind 
the executive branch of government to the limits on expenditures of appropriated funds” 
(Cheney, 2002, p. 2). The Anti-Deficiency Act is composed of three sections of Title 31 
of the U.S. Code: Sections 1341, 1342, and 1517. In general, Section 1341 forbids against 
over obligations, obligating before an appropriation is made or available (Cheney, 2002). 
Section 1342 forbids against the acceptance of voluntary services in exchange for 
personal services that exceed those authorized by law (Cheney, 2002). Section 1517 
prohibits over obligations and expenditures of an apportionment or an amount permitted 
by a regulation (Cheney, 2002). 
Three additional laws relate to the Anti-Deficiency Act because a violation of any 
of these three laws usually leads to an anti-deficiency act violation. These are Sections 
1301 (a), 1502, and 2805 of the Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Section 1301(a) is the “color 
of money” law and says that appropriations should be applied only for the items for 
which the appropriations were intended (Cheney, 2002). Section 1502, known as the 
“bona fide needs” rule, says that only those expenses properly incurred during the period 
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of availability should be applied to the funds, which had been set aside for that definite 
period (Cheney, 2002). Finally, Section 2805 states that the Secretary concerned may 
execute an unspecified minor military construction project, equal to or less than 
$1,500,000, not authorized by law (Cheney, 2002). 
2. Anti-Deficiency Act History and Trends 
The consequence of misinterpreting expense and investment criteria is a potential 
ADA violation. Anti-Deficiency Act history goes as far back as the early 1800s, but it 
was not until the year 1870 that the current law’s predecessor appeared. The law stated 
that it was “not lawful for any department of the government to expend in any one fiscal 
year any sum in excess of appropriations made by Congress for that fiscal year, or to 
involve the government in any contract for the future payment of money in excess of 
such appropriations” (Hedlund, 1984, p. 8). Later, in the years 1905, 1906, and 1950, the 
act was revised. The purpose of these revisions was to make the act more stringent. For 
example, the 1905 revision added the threat of criminal punishment to those who violated 
the act, and the 1906 revision added the prohibition of waivers to the “apportionment by 
monthly allotments” rule except under emergencies or bizarre circumstances (Hedlund, 
1984, p. 8). Then, in 1950, criminal penalties for those who knowingly and willfully 
violated the act were ratcheted up, allowing either a maximum fine of $5,000 or a 2-year 
imprisonment sentence, or both (Hedlund, 1984). 
In spite of the ever-tightening tendency of the act, violations of the act have 
persisted over time. In fact, a 1955 study by House Appropriations showed that the DoD 
committed the most serious violations. Also, from 1963 to 1973, another report showed 
that the Pentagon alone committed 216 out of 278 overall violations that totaled $168 
million. One of the largest violations committed within DoD was one committed by the 
Navy in 1972 totaling $110 million. However, violations do encompass amounts as small 




A more recent study analyzed 62 anti-deficiency act violations in the Department 
of the Navy during the period between 1987 and 1997. The study showed that for 
violations of statute, 87% of violations were Section 1517 violations, 13% were Section 
1341 violations, and not one 1342 violation was reported. 
The following results were reported for violations by availability of 
appropriations, an assessment as to whether funds were “legally available” for a given 
obligation or expenditure. 
• 53% occurred as a result of the purpose not being authorized (Section 
1301) 
• 31% occurred due to obligations or expenditures being outside of the 
amounts allowed by the appropriation 
• 16% occurred due to obligations or expenditures being outside of the time 
limits approved by the appropriation (Cheney, 2002, pp. 22–23) 
The study concluded that 16% of the violations occurred due to obligations or 
expenditures being outside of the time limits approved, were due when “commands 
unknowingly created liabilities in advance of appropriations by letting complex contracts, 
or because of communication errors between a command and claimant” (Cheney, 2002, 
p. 24). The 31% of total violations that occurred outside of the amounts authorized, were 
mainly due to poor accounting practices, such as “the failure to post obligations or 
expenditures in a timely manner,” which led to the incorrect assumption that more money 
was available to spend than what was truly available (Cheney, 2002, p. 24). 
As stated previously, a Section 1301 violation or purpose violation is not in itself 
an anti-deficiency act violation, but it usually leads to one. A typical scenario is: (1) a 
Section 1301 violation is discovered; (2) adjustments are made in the accounting system 
to charge the proper account(s); and (3) charging the proper account results in an over-
obligation or an over-expenditure in that account (Section 1341 or 1517 of the Anti-
Deficiency Act) (Cheney, 2002). 
A specific example that clearly depicts the confusion that leads to a purpose 
violation occurred in the Navy in fiscal year 2003 when Naval Air Station (NAS) and 
Training Wing One (TW-1) Meridian, Mississippi had a requirement for two street 
sweepers because NAS and TW-1 were responsible for maintaining airfield runways and 
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ensuring aircraft were protected from foreign object damage (FOD). The unit cost of each 
street sweeper was below the investment threshold of $250,000, so NAS and TW-1 
obligated O&M funds for two sweeper trucks. NAS and TW-1 officials did not know that 
street sweepers are considered capital assets, are centrally managed by the Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) and are properly funded with Other 
Procurement Navy (OPN) appropriations. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported the street sweeper case as 
an ADA violation; more specifically, as a 31 U.S. C. 1517 violation in fiscal year 2005. 
The remedial action required NAVFAC provide the necessary Other Procurement, Navy 
funds of $313,786 to cover the purchase cost of the street sweepers (GAO No. ADA-05-
15). This amount was in excess of their available balance. 
ADA violations are infrequent, but are the serious consequences of, for example, 
incorrectly identifying an investment as an expense. These violations continue to occur 
for reasons of negligence, misinformation, and lack of knowledge. They are a source of 
embarrassment to the top leadership in the services where these violations occur because 
they are reported to the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the President of the 
United States. How then does leadership deal with this problem? What controls are in 
place to ensure that these occurrences are rare? The answer lies in the implementation of 
policies and laws. 
3. Policy, Law, and Controls 
Laws are implemented through policy. For example, the law (1994 Defense 
Authorization Act) says, “homosexual conduct is incompatible with military service.” 
From this law, the policy implemented is, “don’t ask, don’t tell.” A given law could be 
implemented through different policies. In each year’s Defense Appropriation Act, 
Congress has permitted the DoD to utilize its O&M appropriations to purchase 
investment items having a unit cost less than a certain threshold. In the 2007 DoD 
Appropriations Act, the 109th Congress issued Public Law 109-289 (120 Stat. 1280), 
which stated: 
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SEC. 8031. During the current fiscal year, appropriations which are 
available to the Department of Defense for operation and maintenance 
may be used to purchase items having an investment item unit cost of not 
more than $250,000. 
This law only addresses the $250,000 threshold and is implemented through policy in the 
DoD FMR regarding expense and investment criteria, and then, each service can in turn 
implement their own policies interpreting the FMR, which is based on the law. 
Webster’s on-line dictionary gives the following definitions for policy; 
specifically, as it pertains to the economics domain. 
• A definite course or method of action from among alternatives and in the 
light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future 
decisions 
• A specific decision or set of decisions designed to execute such a chosen 
course of action 
• A projected program consisting of desired objectives and the means to 
achieve them 
The first three definitions of law as defined by the Merriam-Webster on-line dictionary 
are as follows.  
• A binding custom or practice of a community: a rule of conduct or action 
prescribed or formally recognized as binding or enforced by a controlling 
authority 
• The whole body of such customs, practices, or rules 
• (Common law): the control brought about by the existence or enforcement 
of such law 
From the definitions given, law can be considered policy, but policy cannot be 
considered law. Policy “guides” according to the first definition and arguably, law can 
also be seen as a type of guide, albeit, a more stringent type of “guide,” one that must be 
followed. Laws denote strictness and control; they are “binding” and are “enforced by a 
controlling authority.” Given these definitions, breaking a law tends to carry heavier 
punishment than breaking with a policy. Punishment for breaking the law often means 
paying a fine or serving a jail sentence while breaking with policy can translate to a 
formal reprimand or a bad fitness report from the boss. 
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No official punishment for potential ADA violations exists; punishment for actual 
ADA violations can be formidable. Conviction of a violation could mean suspension of 
duty without pay or removal from office, as well as criminal penalties when personnel 
knowingly and willfully commit such violations. Punishment can also result in a 
reduction in grade or a debarment from Federal employment for up to five years, 
suspension, reprimand, or a penalty of up to $1,000 (Inspector General (IG) DoD, 2004, 
p. 1). 
Almost anybody in a leadership role in an organization can make policies, while 
Congress is the only branch of government authorized to make federal laws. Currently, 
controls exist that discourage anti-deficiency act violations at several levels of 
government ranging from the top, at the Congressional level to the bottom, at the 
execution levels. 
In accordance with the Constitution, Congress holds the “power of the purse” 
(Hedlund, 1984, p. 8), while the executive branch executes legislation passed by 
Congress. The ADA was created to give Congress more power and control over those in 
charge of executing the budget. Since Congress is responsible for authorizing and 
appropriating government funds, it needs control mechanisms to ensure that funding is 
spent according to their directions. 
Control points used by Congress include specific language inserted into the 
appropriations act that details exactly how funds should be spent. This is deemed 
“statutory language,” meaning that this type of language is binding by law. Conference 
committee reports also contain exact language that provides direction as to how the 
money should be spent and, although this language is not legally binding, it does carry a 
lot of weight. Failure to adhere to Congressional report language likely results in the 
“wrath” of Congress by way of “lengthy interrogations at hearings, requests for reports 
detailing how money was or is to be spent, and, sometimes a tightening of thresholds for 
reprogramming dollars in budget execution if Congress loses faith in DoD stewardship” 
(Jones, 2008, p. 208). 
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Those who execute the budget at the top echelons of the federal government, such 
as at the department level, also exert some control over the levels below them. 
Departmental level officials are authorized discretion as to the level at which to set the 
responsibility for anti-deficiency violations. For example, if departmental officials 
perceive that a unit is going to have a particularly difficult year in execution, they can set 
anti-deficiency responsibility at one level higher. This tactic allows the departmental 
official the flexibility to shift funding into the unit’s account from other accounts in the 
event of a shortfall, and effectively, excludes that unit from violating the law for 
overspending (Jones, 2008). 
At the execution level, internal controls can be defined as, “a system of checks 
and balances that are used within an organization to ensure that the rules and regulations 
that establish process boundaries are being followed” (Cheney, 2002, p. 16). Internal 
control standard procedures are spelled out in the GAO approved “Standards for Internal 
Control in the Federal Government” publication. Cheney (2002) suggests that: 
to keep Anti-Deficiency Act violations to a minimum, federal managers 
and leaders need to continually assess and evaluate their internal control 
structure to assure that it is well designed and operated. Specifically, 
managers and leaders need to examine internal control to determine how 
well it is performing, how it may be improved, and how it corresponds to 
the five standards for internal control: control environment, risk 
assessment, control activities, information and communications, and 
monitoring. (Cheney, 2002, p. 17) 
Internal controls are “first line of defense” tools that managers at the execution 
level should use to ensure that correct procedures are applied in all activities. When this 
first line of defense breaks down at any area, trouble can rear its head in the form of anti-
deficiency violations and other problems. What tools should leadership implement to 
ensure that subordinates are doing the right thing when it comes to dealing with centrally 
managed items? Should the Department of the Navy emulate policy changes adopted by 
the Air Force concerning centrally managed items, where the Air Force decentralized 
certain centrally managed items? Can the Department of the Navy improve the way its 
assets are centrally managed based on the experience of the Air Force to prevent ADA 
violations? This research attempts to answer these questions. 
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C. METHODOLOGY 
To gauge what lessons can be gleaned from the Air Force decentralization model, 
it was first necessary to understand the current Navy and Marine Corps policies and 
practices concerning centrally managed items. The Navy Financial Management Policy 
Manual (FMPM) was examined to understand the Navy’s criteria for investment and 
expense items. Next, how Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) centrally 
manages vehicles, railway, construction and material handling equipment and what 
systems are used to do so were studied. The publications and tools Naval Supply Systems 
Command uses to define and describe centrally managed items were also researched. The 
final step for the Navy was reviewing Budget Submitting Office (BSO) echelon II 
policies and interviewing budget and financial management officials at the FMB and 
BSO level to ascertain how they manage centrally managed items, the challenges they 
face, how they deal with those challenges, and their recommendations to improve the 
current practices. 
For the United States Marine Corps, the policies and central management 
guidance used for centrally managed items were analyzed. From a recent draft order and 
interviews with Marine Corps officials, the authors addressed and explained specific 
areas of concern for the Marine Corps. Also discovered was what the Marine Corps has 
done to address the issues concerning centrally managed items, what worked, what didn’t 
work, and where they currently are on addressing the issue. 
For the Air Force, their instructions on centrally managed items were reviewed, 
and the process of decentralizing certain previously centrally managed items by changing 
the funding from procurement dollars to O&M dollars with Program Budget Decision 
703 (PBD-703) explained. The authors interviewed Air Force officials involved with the 
transition, as well as officials who currently work with centrally managed items, 
described what has worked and what did not work with the transition, and what changes 
they would like to make to the current policy. The Air Force policy prior to 
decentralization, the transition phase, and the current Air Force policy were compared 
and contrasted. 
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The interviews with the service official and experts focused on retrieving 
information concerning issues, such as centrally managed items and flexibility and 
control, defining centrally managed items, funding, technical solutions, decision making 
criteria, listing and categorizing centrally managed items, and ADA violations. From this 
data, what actual or potential problems were faced in each service with their respective 
policies on centrally managed items were ascertained. It was possible to establish a 
baseline of how differently the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force classify centrally 
managed items, which helped identify problems related to how each service interprets 
and categorizes centrally managed items. Common problems systemic for each of the 
services were discovered. The data were analyzed to make recommendations to FMB-5 
based on lessons learned from the organizations reviewed; specifically, what lessons can 
be learned from the Air Force transition from a centralized model to a decentralized 
model, and back to a new and improved centralized model. 
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III. DATA COLLECTION, PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
A. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
1. Policy and Guidance 
The Navy has multiple, overlapping, and uncoordinated policies stemming from 
sources, such as the Navy’s Financial Management Policy Manual, Civil Engineer 
Support Equipment policy, and Navy Supply policy. This section summarizes the policies 
and guidance with respect to expense, investment, and centrally managed items. The data 
show how different communities and functional organizations in the Navy make and use 
their own policies and guidance. 
a. Financial Management Policy Manual 
Chapter 3 of the Department of the Navy Financial Management Policy 
Manual (FMPM) defines expense and investment criteria, and gives some examples of 
items within each category. Expenses are defined as, “costs budgeted in and financed by 
Operation and Maintenance” (NAVSO P-1000 2002, p. 3-1). Examples of consumable 
expenses are classified and listed in nine categories. These include: “labor, rental 
payments on leases, food, clothing, and petroleum oil, and lubricant items; expendable 
supplies and materials; facilities sustainment; O&M funded restoration and 
modernization projects; and items not designated as Appropriation Purchases Account or 
Marine Corps Appropriation Stores Account;” and, “all other equipment items not in the 
preceding categories that have a unit value of less than $250,000 and which are not 
designated for centralized item management and asset control” (NAVSO P-1000 p. 3-2, 
2002). 
Investments are defined as, “cost of capital assets of the Department of 
Defense, such as real property and equipment that provide new or additional military 
capabilities or maintain existing capabilities” (NAVSO P-1000, 2002, p. 3-2). Examples 
of investment items are classified as “all items of equipment, including assemblies, spares 
and repair parts, which are subject to centralized item management and asset control by 
an inventory manager or an inventory control point in the central supply system, 
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including items designated as Appropriation Purchases Account or Marine Corps 
Appropriation Stores Account,” excluding items under NWCF management and, “other 
items of equipment, except for those designated as expense under subparagraph 2, having 
a system unit cost of $100,000 or more are investment items,” costs associated with 
construction and ship conversion, and other investment costs, specifically, “any cost 
designated as expense under subparagraph 2 when included in the production or 
construction of an investment item is considered an investment cost, except for costs 
associated with military personnel” (NAVSO P-1000, 2002, p. 3-3). 
The FMPM lists conditional cases that take precedence over the expense 
and investment criteria listed above. This includes initial outfitting, ammunition, 
explosives, modification, maintenance, technology refresh, and installation of equipment. 
The FMPM also specifies that specialized equipment, such as test equipment and trainers 
is centrally managed and financed by major commands, which have technical 
responsibility for the requirement (NAVSO P-1000, 2002). 
b. Civil Engineer Support Equipment Policy 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) centrally manages 
Budget Activity 5 Civil Engineering Support Equipment (CESE). NAVFAC is the single 
manager within the Navy for automotive vehicles, construction and weight handling 
equipment, and railway equipment. NAVFAC determines the requirements 
determination, programming and budgeting for acquisition, utilization, maintenance and 
operation for this equipment. BSOs are instructed to comply with management, reporting, 
and other requirements specified by NAVFAC concerning CESE items (OPNAVINST 
11240.8H, 2008). The NAVFAC P-300 Management of Civil Engineering Support 
Equipment contains specific guidance for ground maintenance equipment and leases. The 
Construction Automotive and Specialized Equipment Management Information System 
(CASEMIS) descriptive reference table provides the information and lists of specific 
CESE equipment (NAVFAC P-300, 2003). 
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c. Navy Supply Policy 
The Naval Supply Procedures Publication 485 (P-485), Volume II 
Appendix 18, lists cognizance symbols (commonly referred to as cog), which are two-
digit alphanumeric codes prefixed to identify national stock numbers (NSNs) and the 
cognizant inventory manager, the stores account, and the type of material (NAVSUP P-
485, 1997). Most Navy logisticians and supply officials are familiar with cog codes, 
while most comptroller and financial staff are not. Generally, if an item bears an even- 
numbered cog, such as 0, 2, 4, 6, and 8 (except 2A and 8A), this denotes that the item is 
carried in the Appropriation Purchases Account (APA) and funded with procurement 
dollars, which are centrally managed. For example, NAVFAC is the inventory manager 
for 2C (major construction and civil engineering equipment), NAVSEA is the inventory 
manager for 2F (major shipboard and electronic equipment), NAVAIR is the inventory 
manager for 4V (aircraft engines), and Navy Inventory Control Point Mechanicsburg 
(NAVICP MECH) is the inventory manager for 6L (Surface/Subsurface Training 
Devices). Odd number cogs, 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 denote items carried in the NWCF, which 
are mostly consumable, funded with expense or O&M funds, and not centrally managed. 
These items, however, do have an inventory manager and a unit assigned for technical 
responsibility. 
Another source used by logisticians and supply personnel is DoD 
EMALL, which shows whether an item is centrally managed. DoD EMALL is an Internet 
based Electronic Mall. It allows military customers and other authorized government 
customers to search for and order items from government and commercial sources. DoD 
EMALL is a DoD program operated by the Defense Logistics Information Service 
(DLIS) and provides a secure location to shop and order NSN’s and commercial items. 
DoD EMALL is used by DoD, military services, Federal government and Civil Agency 
personnel, budget and finance offices, and contractors with government contracts. DoD 
EMALL is a powerful search engine, which allows access to product information from a 
wide variety of government, and supplier managed catalogs, including over 1,450 
commercial catalogs with over 32 million items available to registered users (DoD 
EMALL, 2009). In the product information for items with NSNs, DoD EMALL lists an 
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Acquisition Advice Code. All items in DoD EMALL coded “J” are identified and defined 
as, “not stocked, centrally procured # (non-stocked items) IMM/service centrally 
managed but not stocked item, procurement will be initiated only after receipt of a 
requisition.” Navy budget officials use DoD EMALL for NSN items to determine 
whether they are centrally procured. If centrally procured, they are centrally managed, 
but DoD EMALL does not tell the inquirer who centrally procures the item (Anonymous, 
personal communication, August 25, 2009). 
2. Practices and Areas of Concern 
In the Navy, each Budget Submitting Office (BSO) and functional organization 
has its own practices and areas of concern regarding centrally managed items. This 
section discusses how each organization deals with centrally managed items by 
establishing and operating with different practices. The BSOs operate in a stove piped 
structure because practice guidelines are not standardized, but delegated to the 
organizational level. Best practices are not normally shared between BSOs. It becomes 
evident that central management is not central at all. It is dispersed among various 
commands that centrally manage subsets of equipment.  
Navy echelon III Budget Submitting Offices (BSOs) and below contact echelon II 
or FMB budget analysts to ascertain whether items are centrally managed. A Navy FMB 
official stated that when determining whether an item is centrally managed, they refer to 
the FMPM budget activity and determine which echelon II BSO owns the preponderance 
of that equipment. Once the BSO that owns the majority of that equipment is identified, 
FMB contacts a budget analyst at the echelon II BSO to discover if the item is centrally 
managed. Each echelon II BSO has their own policy on centrally managed items, but no 
list or database exists or has been published to identify which items are centrally 
managed. 
Organizations at the echelon II BSO level, such as NAVAIR and NAVSEA, are 
authorized to make their own policies concerning centrally managed items. The policies 
made at this level can be more stringent than the DoN and DoD policies on expense and 
investment items, as long as they comply with the DoN and DoD policies. At the FMB 
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level, an official stated that policies are not only changed when issues or problems arise, 
but also when trying to determine whether or not more efficient policies exist to adopt 
based on lessons learned from trends or other service components. Generally, issues are 
addressed at the lowest level by the echelon II comptroller with a less formal email policy 
clarification, a more formal financial note, or a FMB financial management policy 
determination for systemic issues (Anonymous, personal communication, August 25, 
2009). 
An echelon II budget official believes that trying to compile a list of items by 
nomenclature would be obsolete once published and would be difficult to compile given 
the number of items managed in the Navy. The official believes that it would be better to 
list general categories of items as listed in the P-485, and if these had been available 
previously, they could have helped to prevent previous ADA violations. Based on their 
experience, the Navy echelon II official believes that most units base purchase 
authorization on whether the unit cost is above or below $250,000. If an item is below the 
expense and investment threshold, some lower echelon units think they can purchase the 
equipment with O&M funds. Most units know that vehicles and forklifts are centrally 
managed by NAVFAC and NAVSUP, but historically some units have actually attempted 
to purchase these items. The Supply Corps is familiar with the information in the P-485, 
but most financial managers are not familiar with the P-485, and in which volume and 
appendix the information is contained. To inform and educate personnel, the Navy 
official offers and conducts cross training for financial managers, engineers, logisticians, 
and contract personnel at both of the echelon II BSOs interviewed. 
NAVSUP provides some of this information on its website, but the layout of the 
website changes. As a result, the echelon II budget official had a difficult time accessing 
the information, and also, had issues with accessing the site because of CAC certificate 
identification problems to access the unclassified P-485. The official suggested providing 
a “do not buy with O&M funds list” of items purchased with procurement dollars, similar 
to the list given to government purchase cardholders. With the proliferation of 
government purchase cardholders, unit members with purchase cards do not know what 
is and is not centrally managed, since the cardholders are generally in administrative jobs. 
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For example, they may not know that they cannot buy a forklift, vehicle, or a Secure 
Telephone Unit (STU) phone. The purchase cardholder is only concerned with following 
the purchase card rules. At the echelon II level, the official stated that they are able to 
catch, preclude, or stop these types of purchases before they develop into a more serious 
problem. 
NAVICP can also search for cog codes, so the echelon II official often verifies 
with NAVICP to ascertain the cog code for an item. Sometimes, COG codes have not yet 
been assigned for Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) items, but items are easily purchased 
on the Internet with a unit government purchase card. Towards the end of the fiscal year, 
if units receive additional O&M funds, units typically check with the echelon II budget 
office to discover whether they can purchase the equipment. For example, if the unit does 
not know the cog code, the echelon II comptroller can do the research to find the cog 
code, with the assistance of NAVICP, or check with the Business Financial Manager 
(BFM) in the Program Office to determine how they should be funded, and whether an 
upgrade or modernization is already scheduled. If an upgrade or modernization is 
scheduled, a fleet unit cannot use O&M funds, because the FMR states that all upgrades 
are funded with procurement dollars. No centralized database exists that informs who 
centrally manages specific items, such as weapons. The Navy official knew that a 
machine gun was centrally managed, but did not know who the central manager was for a 
specific machine gun. By networking, making numerous phone calls, and through emails, 
which prove to be time consuming, the official was able to learn that NAVSEA was the 
Navy’s central manager for the specific type of machine gun. 
An echelon II Navy official was concerned that if certain items are decentralized, 
those items need to be treated like consumables and do not receive allowances or spare 
parts stocked for them. A program office might still be required to re-outfit and issue 
spares, as needed. The official cited an example where the program office for a particular 
type of machine gun was able to have NAVICP designate the gun with an odd cog code 
without any spares allotted. Meanwhile, the machine guns were initially issued as a “free 
issue” item. The fleet units were happy until the machine guns started breaking and 
required maintenance because no replacements could be provided as “ready for issue” 
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since replacements had not been allotted. Additionally, with the odd cog designation, the 
gun was not free issue. Thus, the unit either had to purchase a new gun or pay for repairs 
out of their Operational Target (OPTAR) or O&M funds, while the platform to which the 
gun belonged, remained non-operational without the gun. When the fleet realized this, 
they looked to the program office, which had designated the odd cog code, to resolve the 
dilemma. Normally, the machine guns have an even cog code and the program office 
allots for replacements and spares for free issue to the fleet for damaged, lost, or stolen 
items (Anonymous, personal communication, September 15, 2009). 
According to another Navy echelon II budget official, centrally managed items 
are purchased outside the stock fund, and the echelon II unit provides the full gambit of 
asset management. This includes buying a warehouse services contract, storing those 
items in the warehouse, tracking the distribution, tracking carcass returns, and 
establishing a repair contract to place the carcass returns on and then put them back into 
inventory as ready for issue. In the DoD FMR expense and investment decision table, the 
second question asks, “is the item purchased from the DWCF?” According to a Navy 
Echelon II budget official, most financial managers do not understand what items are 
purchased from revolving funds. The official believes most financial managers think 
WCF purchases are purchased with O&M funds instead of procurement funds planned 
and budgeted for by a surface warfare center, undersea warfare center, or an echelon II 
BSO, such as NAVAIR. 
The official believes that when the DoD established the DWCF, stock funds were 
incorporated into the DWCF, as part of the revolving fund construct. “Stock fund” is now 
an antiquated term, which is synonymous with WCF. The FMR uses DWCF in the 
question, but the FMR does not clarify whether or not this includes component WCFs, 
such as the Navy Working Capital Fund. According to the Navy official, the FMR’s 
question should be changed to, “is the item purchased from the stock fund?” If the answer 
is yes, then ask, “if the item is part of a full funding effort?” If yes, then classify it as an 
investment. Full funding efforts are budgeted for in Other Procurement Navy (OPN) 
funding, if the item is outside the new construction time frame. If the item is not 
purchased from the stock fund, then it should be classified as an investment because the 
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unit who purchased the item is controlling it themselves with the full gambit of asset 
management. According to the official, this explanation is not provided in the FMR, and 
the FMPM (NAVSO P-1000) does not adequately describe the term “centrally managed.” 
Consequently, most Navy personnel do not understand how central management works. 
The official also believes that the interpretation of central management differs 
between organizations, such as NAVSEA and NAVAIR, because the Navy policy 
officials have not come to a consensus on the definition of central management. The 
official believes a problem exists because neither the FMR nor FMPM contain a list of 
centrally managed items. An example provided was a new requirement for afloat body 
armor for riverine craft, which have a unit cost between $1,500 and $2,000. NAVSEA 
bought warehouse space and the initial cadre of afloat body armor and established a 
distribution system, a carcass return system, and a repair contract to return carcasses to 
ready for issue condition. NAVSEA worked with FMB-5 to establish NAVSEA’s central 
management of all afloat body armor; NAVSEA became the central manager for the 
entire Navy. The problem was that not everyone in the Navy was aware of that. The 
NAVSEA comptroller wrote a financial note stating that afloat body armor was centrally 
managed, and had the Navy Comptroller concur with the financial note to define how 
body armor is centrally managed and paid for with OPN funding. The Navy official said 
this process does not always happen, because personnel misinterpret the FMR, and 
purchase items, which are actually centrally managed. In the official’s opinion, it is 
essential to agree upon a consensus on the definition of centrally managed. Also, a 
database of centrally managed items should exist so the funds can be budgeted for or 
transferred to the central management agency to purchase the items required for the entire 
Navy, not just NAVSEA (Anonymous, personal communication, September 22, 2009). 
In summary, central management is delegated to BSOs, but not aggregated by one 
command, and different BSOs have different opinions and interpretations of central 
management. In practice, pockets or subsets of central management exist, which allow 
flexibility, but can create areas of concern if information is not shared and communicated 
about which items are centrally managed and by whom. 
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B. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
1. Policy and Guidance 
The United States Marine Corps purchases centrally managed items with 
procurement dollars. If items are not centrally managed, but have a system unit cost that 
is equal to or greater than the expense/investment threshold of $250,000, investment 
appropriations are also used. Items not centrally managed and possessing a system unit 
cost less than $250,000 are financed using operations and maintenance funding or 
expense appropriations. In addition to the DOD FMR, the Marine Corps also relies on 
other guidance established by the Navy, such as the NAVSO P-1000 “Financial 
Management Policy Manual.” 
The Marine Corps currently uses the DoD FMR criteria to identify how an item 
should be funded (whether with procurement or O&M) for only a portion of items that 
fall within the Combat Development or Acquisition/Life Cycle Management framework. 
A Table of Authorized Materiel Control Number (TAMCN), within a system called the 
Total Force Structure Management System (TFSMS), identifies them. This system 
provides data on each piece of equipment, such as the responsible Program manager and 
the Stores Account Code (SAC). The SAC can aid in identifying if an item should be 
bought with procurement funds or O&M. For example, an item identified as a SAC-3 
item is a centrally managed item to be funded with procurement dollars, while an item 
identified as a SAC-1 item is funded with O&M dollars, except for initial issues. 
While Marine Corps Combat Development Command primarily uses TFSMS, 
other functional areas use systems, such as Supported Activities Supply System 
(SASSY), Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management System (MIMMS), PC 
MIMMS, Asset Tracking, Logistics, and Supply System (ATLASS), which are used at all 
levels of command for logistics, maintenance, and supply management; and Standard 
Accounting, Budgeting, and Reporting System (SABRS), which is used by financial 
managers. These systems do identify some centrally managed items, and only some of 
the systems interface with each other. 
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2. Practices and Areas of Concern 
Similar to Navy practices, Marine Corps practices concerning centrally managed 
items exist in multiple forms and are uncoordinated. Currently, Marine Corps central 
management guidance exists only for those items that fall within the Combat 
Development framework. Financial administrators have recently identified the need for 
guidance, which identifies appropriate funding for all equipment items. Marine Corps 
officials have noticed that many officials are unsure of exactly what constitutes “centrally 
managed items.” An official stated that it seems to be very clear when it comes to large 
end items and items procured and distributed by the Marine Corps Systems Command 
(MARCORSYSCOM), but not so clear when it comes to items, such as computers, 
security systems, and base support equipment. Much of this confusion was brought about 
because of supplemental funding for operations, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and other Overseas Contingency Operations 
(OCO). Additionally, special items, such as physical security, garrison equipment, and IT 
equipment and audiovisual and telecommunication equipment, have created areas of 
concern when trying to determine whether specific items are centrally managed or not. 
Marine Corps officials feel clearer policy is needed to address authority, roles and 
responsibilities, and procedures for procurement of PMC-funded items not executed in 
the normal Combat Development or Acquisition/Life Cycle Management framework, and 
which, are not already accounted for in TFSMS for the types of items previously listed. 
Marine Corps officials were so concerned about this issue, that a Marine Corps Order 
(MCO) has been drafted to define centrally managed programs. Specifically, Table 2 lists 









Budget Line Item  Program 
510109   Audiovisual and Telecommunication 
 505098   Command Support Equipment 
 430298   Commercial Cargo Vehicles 
 430398   Commercial Passenger Vehicles 
 262198   Garrison Mobile Engineer Equipment 
 261998   Material Handling Equipment (I&L) 
 505198   Warehouse Modernization 
 500198   Base Telecommunications 
 508698   Physical Security 
 110898   Marine Common Hardware Suite 
Table 2.   Marine Corps Centrally Managed Functional Areas of Concern (From: 
MCO 7100.XX Draft, 2009, p. 2). 
According to Marine Corps officials, different organizations within the Marine 
Corps centrally manage different types of items; in essence, aligning functional expertise 
and management responsibility within these organizations to specific types of items at the 
echelon II level. The Plans Policy and Operations (PP&O) organization is mainly 
responsible for physical security. Installations and Logistics (I&L) is responsible for 
various types of items, such as command support equipment, commercial cargo and 
passenger vehicles, warehouse modernization, etc. Command and Control, 
Communications, and Computers (C-4) is responsible audiovisual and 
telecommunication, base telecommunication, and common hardware suite items. Finally, 
Training and Education (TECOM) and MARCORSYSCOM are each responsible for 
other types of equipment. 
Officials were concerned that the terminology used in categorizing items can be 
confusing, and that terms, such as “centrally managed program,” “centrally managed 
items,” “centrally procured items,” and “program of record” need clarification. For 
example, a centrally procured item is an item initially purchased via a central agency. It 
can be either an expense or an investment item. While a centrally controlled item can be 
purchased locally using O&M funds, it must be registered at a central location. 
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Another area of concern, which often arises, occurs when the Marine Corps needs 
to purchase a new item. No central authority exists that decides whether a new item is to 
be centrally managed, what is and is not centrally managed is determined at the echelon 
II level. Instead, administrators at the functional organization that deals with the general 
category of items related to the new item decide whether the item should be centrally 
managed. In the meantime, confusion prevails as the information of what organization 
manages the item is not yet available (MCO 7100.XX Draft, 2009). 
Furthermore, officials are concerned that no single requirements process similar 
to the Combat Development process exists, which defines, validates, and documents 
requirements. A lack of uniformity also exists concerning how these items are managed, 
with each organization having its own policies and procedures. These policies and 
procedures are not widely known, and as an official recently stated, no central location 
exists to go and find this information. 
When Marine Corps administrators first began looking at these issues with 
centrally managed programs a few years ago, they thought several of these issues could 
be addressed by compiling a list of centrally managed items and placing it in a database 
for all to see. They hired a contractor to create a comprehensive list of all centrally 
managed items. The contractor discovered that TFSMS was already a repository for the 
majority of items purchased in the Marine Corps; however, TFSMS is only used by 
Development Command and focuses on combat equipment. Administrators had to decide 
whether they could use this technology to include those items not already resident within 
TFSMS. Sample data was pulled from TFSMS, but administrators discovered overlap in 
systems used by other echelon II commands and numerous items to list. Once a list was 
created, it would soon be obsolete with the addition of new centrally managed equipment 
to the Marine Corps inventory. They needed a simpler tool. Not wanting to duplicate 
efforts and create yet another database for those items left out of TFSMS, administrators 
began looking at other options. 
The notion of drafting a Marine Corps-wide order surfaced as a possible solution. 
As one administrator put it, no consistent way of applying terms existed, such as 
“centrally managed,” the order would attempt to clarify terms that led to confusion. 
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General categories of items and the functional representative responsible for managing 
such items would be posted. These items would only include centrally managed items. In 
the end, the order would be published in the hopes of clearing up any misconceptions on 
centrally managed programs and providing a central “location” for everyone in the 
Marine Corps to go to for guidance (Anonymous, personal communication, August 6, 
2009). 
In summary, lack of uniformity concerning the meaning of terminology 
associated with central item management terminology, is experienced by personnel at all 
levels. This is a critical area of concern since personnel without adequate knowledge are 
not be able to make correct decisions if they do not posses or cannot attain the requisite 
knowledge. Finally, different functional organizations and communities manage different 
sets of centrally managed items, with each having its own guidelines and practices. To 
add to the confusion, information on which organization manages what items is not 
shared.  
C. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
1. Policy and Guidance 
Air Force Instruction (AFI) 65-601 Volume 1 Budget Guidance and Procedures 
explains how the Air Force distinguishes between expense and investment costs. The Air 
Force provides Figure 1 in the instruction manual. 
The Air Force diagram is mainly based on the DOD FMR policy. While it is a 
simpler version of the DOD FMR expense/investment diagram since it excludes the 
Working Capital Fund (WCF) and full funding effort criteria, it does not add value. It 




Figure 1.   Investment Cost Decision Diagram (From: AFI 65-601, Vol. 1, 2005, p. 67) 
More specifically, AFI 65-601 provides entire sections on whether certain items 
should be appropriated with expense or investment funds. One of the items, discussed in 
section 4B, is Information Processing Equipment (IPE), such as local area network 
(LAN) acquisition, ancillary IPE (personal computers (PC), printers, etc.), embedded 
computers, and PC application software loaded on network file servers. This section has 
detailed information and criteria, which spans five and a half pages. Other sections, such 
as section 4E, discuss technical data and the different contingencies involved with this. 
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For example, discussed are the acquisitions, modifications, and post acquisitions and 
modifications pertaining to technical data, which functions should be funded with O&M 
funds, and which should be funded with investment funds (AFI 65-601, Vol. 1, 2005). 
a. Air Force Decentralization and Program Budget Decision 703 
In 2001 and 2003, the Air Force attempted to decentralize support 
equipment funding, but concerns delayed the effort. Air Combat Command (ACC) 
provided non-concurrence with the idea because the Information Technology (IT) system 
in place was inadequate to support this effort. ACC was also concerned that this shift 
would overburden MAJCOM staff due to increased workloads. The Headquarters Air 
Force (HAF) delayed the initiative pending IT Tool development. 
The Air Force wanted to move towards a decentralized model because the 
HAF was having difficulty defending the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) due 
to the corporate structure of the Air Force; the HAF was too far removed from the 
processes at the Major Command (MAJCOM) level. POMs were being built with 
straight-line inflation methodology versus real computations. Also, these estimates did 
not reflect MAJCOM’s operational needs and did not take into account project service 
life. 
Another issue was support equipment buys not directly linked to current 
warfighter prioritized needs. According to HAF, the process was fragmented, with no 
direct link between requisitions, buys, and deliveries. Air Force administrators hoped that 
decentralization would place MAJCOMs in direct control of requisitions, buys, and 
deliveries. This direct control would lead to (1) decreased bureaucracy and provide 
MAJCOMs with increased flexibility to make changes readily throughout the PPBE 
process; (2) quicker deliveries of items to the warfighter; and (3) results would provide a 
better representation of MAJCOM priorities (HAF, 2005). 
This initiative was important to the Air Force because it would, (1) 
provide “the warfighter with the equipment items in minimal time and at a reasonable 
cost,” and (2) support the “warfighter priorities during execution,” giving him “the ability 
to react to emerging requirements” (U.S. Air Force, n.d.). 
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As in prior years, the MAJCOMs had several concerns with the 
decentralization initiative. The MAJCOM staffs were initially flustered with the 
decentralization of vehicles. They had grown accustomed to the current processes and 
liked how these functioned. They were also afraid that once they had gone through all the 
trouble of decentralizing, they might end up back at a centralized model if the 
decentralized model did not work. As far as the decentralization of the support 
equipment, the ACC, as before, was still concerned about the increased workload with no 
additional manpower approved. Also, they still felt that the IT tools in place were 
inadequate to deal with this new change. Yet, when it came to the overall initiative, 
deemed the Equipment Transformation Initiative, initial hesitations were finally 
overcome. The MAJCOMs got on board with a 3-star commitment and coordinated 
approval with the Financial Management (FM), Logistics (LG) and Plans, and Programs 
(XP) branches (HAF, 2005). 
The Air Force 2006 budget estimates submitted to Congress in February 
2005 included a $3.2 billion transfer from Other Procurement to O&M appropriation 
(Active, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserves) because of the increased threshold 
and the Equipment Transformation Initiative (ETI). 
After the budget estimate was submitted, Program Budget Decision (PBD) 
703, was issued by DoD, which realigned equipment with a system or item cost below 
the threshold of $250,000 from the procurement to the O&M portfolio. In effect, this 
action decentralized items previously centralized under the procurement appropriation. 
The “Items Less Than $5M” lines were consolidated, where appropriate, and are listed in 
Appendix A from the FY2006 Air Force Investment Reduction Request (Department of 
the Air Force, 2005). 
Program Budget Decision 703 approved the creation of six new program 
elements that would directly “map back” to the investment items reprogrammed from 
procurement to O&M. Table 3 presents a list of the codes created to track the realigned 
support equipment items, with the Air Force Element of Expense Code (AFEEIC) 638 
(Lean Equipment Management Support Equipment), especially created for this initiative 
to ensure funding accountability. 
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63812 Aircraft Support Equipment  
63883 Electrical Support Equipment 
63817 War Consumables  
63884 Other Base Maintenance Support Equipment 
63882 Vehicle Support Equipment 
63886 Replenishment Spares 
Table 3.   Air Force Lean Equipment Management Support Equipment Element of 
Expense Code (From: Program Budget Decision No. 703, 2005). 
The PBD disapproved the realignment of resources for the following 
categories of equipment, due to congressional interest, another service being the 
Executive Agent, or economy of scale reasons: (1) Passenger Carrying Vehicles, (2) 
Night Vision Goggles, (3) Medium Tactical Vehicle, (4) High Mobility Vehicle, (5)Civil 
Air Patrol Vehicles, (6 and 7) HMMWV (Armored and Up-Armored), (8) 
Firefighting/Crash Rescue Vehicles, and (9) Runway Snow Removal and Cleanup 
Equipment (PBD 703, 2005). 
2. Practices and Areas of Concern 
This section discusses how the Air Force practices concerning centrally managed 
items evolved over time to create a new organization called Central Asset Management 
(CAM). It also describes how CAM now centrally manages all Air Force support 
equipment. 
a. Central Asset Management 
During the same time period as the decentralization effort, HAF developed 
the Central Asset Management (CAM) concept, originally known as Future Financials, 
which falls under Air Force Material Command (AFMC). CAM was developed as part of 
the Air Forces Expeditionary Logistics for the 21st Century (eLog21), which is the Air 
Force wide transformation campaign implemented in phases between 2001 and 2012 to 
allow time for process development, integration, and training. The eLog21 Campaign 
plan is designed to transition Air Force logistic processes from the current reactionary, 
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functionally stove-piped processes to an anticipatory (planning based), cross-functional 
(highly trained), integrated (fully visibility by all parties), high performance (new 
metrics) operation to better support the warfighter. The eLog21 plan is more than a 
technology implementation; it is a fundamental business process redesign, designed to 
have a major impact across the entire logistics enterprise. Technology is not the focus of 
the campaign but the enabler (Air Force Material Command, 2009). 
The Air Force does not view CAM as an eLog21 initiative, but rather a 
capability, which contributes manpower savings by centralizing various administrative 
functions. Centrally programming, budgeting, executing, accounting for, and reporting 
financial resources enables the Air Force logistics community to overhaul maintenance 
processes at bases and depots and contract strategies significantly for spare parts support. 
It also facilitates the process that applies engineering efforts to sustain aging fleets 
without being hindered by rigid, excessively detailed financial processes. The 
overarching intent of CAM is to streamline and simplify the following processes for all 
weapon system sustainment accounts: (1) requirements determination, (2) resource 
prioritization, (3) budgeting, and (4) execution. Requirements are determined and 
prioritized in light of overarching Air Force needs with input from the Commands 
executing the mission. In effect, the operators express their needs, and then CAM, as an 
executive agent for the Air Staff, exercises all the appropriate processes to accommodate 
those needs, leaving the operators to focus on their war and peacetime missions. 
Meanwhile, AFMC uses financial flexibilities, possible under the CAM construct, to 
react and respond to real world events requiring adjustments to planned capability 
deliveries. In this construct, AFMC is responsible for all PPBE activities to meet 
statutory reporting requirements and provide Air Force leadership with adequate 
information for decision-making (Air Force Material Command, 2009). 
According to AFMC, prior to CAM, the Air Force PPBE process 
generated extraordinary amounts of data at the item level. The using command had 
“exactly” the right amount of funds for each part required during a given fiscal year. The 
complex web of Major Command (MAJCOM) headquarters level, base level, and 
sustainment center financial processes, was aimed at achieving resource allocation 
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perfection in an imperfect (variable) support environment, which focused Air Force 
attention on the means rather than the end. The major roadblock of funding, rigidly 
compartmentalized by MAJCOM, by weapon system and sustainment element or 
Element of Expense/Investment Code (EEIC), meant the financial processes in place 
could not enable transformed logistics processes without significant overhaul (Air Force 
Material Command, 2009). 
In September 2003, planning started to enable eLog21 to be successful. 
Budgeting, accounting and reporting had to be streamlined so that Air Force costs would 
be captured at points where value was added in a process, rather than at every point of 
transfer within the Air Force. Centralization became the cornerstone of this effort for both 
the Air Force financial management and logistics communities. In May 2005, a plan had 
been developed to centralize programming, budgeting, and execution with one Air Force 
executive agent. However, because no clear mandate had ever been given, there was little 
impetus for change. As a result, the Future Financials proposal devolved to become little 
more than status quo with a different governance structure and a greater role for higher 
commands. By December 2005, realizing that the latest Future Financials proposal fell 
short of the intended mark to truly change, and believing that full centralization could 
indeed fulfill that intention, Air Force logistics leadership invited AFMC to be involved 
in the new proposal. The Air Force realized the benefits of centralization, but knew this 
situation called for process change. The CSAF approved the centralization concept for 
Future Financials in December 2005 and Future Financials was renamed Consolidated 
Asset Management (CAM) (Air Force Material Command, 2009). 
After CAM stood up, the governance structure evolved as the AFMC was 
still developing the needed processes as they began executing them. The CAM concept 
represented a tremendous paradigm shift, which required collaboration, trust building, 
and hard work to gain stakeholder support. The CAM was not only focused on 
centralized asset management, it involved much more. The goal of CAM transformation 
involved four pillars: (1) centralized funding, (2) centralized requirements determination, 
(3) performance-based logistics (capability versus end items), and (4) integrated 
wholesale supply and depot maintenance operations. Enterprise requirement 
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determination entailed a fundamental shift in how the Air Force looked at sustaining its 
resources from a MAJCOM centric view to a common Air Force View. For example, 
prior to CAM, the maintenance, engineering, data, spare parts, and equipment needs of 
the F-15 fleet are determined in a piecemeal fashion by the six MAJCOMs that fly F-15s. 
Each entity sets a level of support for its portion of the fleet, but no one entity controls 
the resources to support the entire fleet from a holistic perspective. This applied across all 
Air Force platforms and equipment (Air Force Material Command, 2009). 
CAM radically streamlined and simplified the requirements determination 
process, the resource prioritization process, the budgeting process and the execution 
process for all sustainment accounts. Requirements are currently determined and 
prioritized in light of overarching Air Force needs with input from the commands 
executing the mission. The operators express their needs and an executive agent, CAM 
exercises all the appropriate processes to accommodate those needs, while the operators 
focus on their missions, not administrative tasks. Given that AFMC currently “owns” all 
the factors of production with respect to sustainment, AFMC assumes responsibility for 
bringing together the customers’ needs with the full range of provider services to meet 
those needs. AFMC is responsible for all PPBE activities (Air Force Material Command, 
2009). 
Figure 2 shows the requirements, programming/budgeting, and execution 
processes prior to CAM. The MAJCOMS developed their individual requirements with 
technical/engineering input from AFMC Product and Logistics Centers. The MAJCOMs 
then build their POM and Budget inputs based on those requirements. AFMC’s Air 
Logistics Centers, Depot Maintenance, and Supply Management budgets were developed 
considering the funded requirements of the MAJCOMs. All POM and Budget inputs 
flowed through, and were approved by the Air Staff. Upon enactment, funds flowed back 
through the Air Staff to the MAJCOMs for execution. Each MAJCOM provided funds to 
the applicable AFMC product or logistic center, on a program-by-program and expense-
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Figure 2.   Process prior to CAM (From: Air Force Material Command CAM Program 
Overview, Slide 10, 2009).  
Figure 3 shows the requirements, programming/budgeting, and execution 
process currently under CAM. MAJCOMs work directly with AFMC to develop 
requirements and prioritize those requirements within an Air Force enterprise construct. 
Both Product and Logistic Center personnel participate from both a technical/engineering 
and a pricing perspective in this process. Once prioritized, AFMC submits a POM and 
Budget request to the Air Staff and is the proponent for that request (along with Air Force 
logistics leadership) through the Air Force corporate process. Support from the 
MAJCOMs may be necessary, particularly for adequately explaining the operational 
impacts of any adjustments to the collaboratively approved submission. Once funds are 
enacted, AFMC directs funds to the applicable Product and Logistic Centers for 
execution. Throughout the year, the CAM office is responsible for maintaining oversight 
on the latest operational needs of the Air Force, as well as any pending outyear decisions, 
which affect current year direction. AFMC manages sustainment, by considering both 
individual MAJCOM needs and higher-level AF priorities. The intent is to present one 
face to the warfighting customer vice the multiple faces in the pre-cam process to have 
their assets supported, through collaboration and Air Force wide visibility (Air Force 
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Figure 3.   Process with CAM (From: Air Force Material Command CAM Program 
Overview, Slide 11, 2009). 
To summarize, CAM provides an enterprise approach, which gives the Air 
Force more flexibility, not more funds, by giving the Air Force the ability to move 
funding from one program to another; however, one program is still impacted by reduced 
funding. There was a zero sum gain during the transition to the CAM program, which 
meant collaboration, communication, and information sharing with MAJCOMs was the 
key to determining tradeoffs. CAM was not designed for and is not used for Air Force 
Reserve Command and Air National Guard units (Air Force Material Command, 2009). 
b. Support Equipment Transformation 
Support Equipment Transformation (SET) preceded the decentralization 
of funding for Support Equipment (SE), introduced in PBD 703 under the Equipment 
Transformation Initiative. During the decentralization, the MAJCOMs transferred their 
O&M funds for SE to AFMC to purchase SE. The decentralization of SE only lasted one 
year, and recentralized under CAM. In 2006, with the CAM and through SET, the Air 
Force intended for each MAJCOM to have improved visibility and control over their 
requirements determination, prioritization, and funding processes. Assets with a unit cost 
less than $250,000 were moved from the Investment portfolio to O&M funding portfolio; 
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thereby, providing the MAJCOMs the flexibility to buy required items with O&M funds. 
The goal of the program was to improve the war-fighter’s control of their SE assets and 
funding, while, at the same time, improve SE asset visibility for both MAJCOMs and the 
Air Force (AMC Instruction 20-101, 2005). 
Support equipment is defined as centrally procured equipment items that 
are not consumed in use, or do not lose the original identity when incorporated into, or 
attached to, another assembly. Virtually every Air Force organization has support 
equipment. Support equipment runs from large items, such as generators, compressors, 
mobile field kitchens, and air conditioners, to smaller items, such as maintenance stands, 
water carts, fire extinguishers, light kits, and certain specialized tools. For each category 
of support equipment, a MAJCOM is designated as a lead MAJCOM for that category of 
SE. Support equipment is identified by Expendability, Reparability, Recoverability 
Category (ERRC) codes of NF* (non-expendable, field level repair) or ND*, (non-
expendable, depot level repair). The third digit of the ERRC is the Equipment 
Management Code, which designates the level of accountability (AMC Instruction 20-
101, 2005). 
Unit equipment custodians identify their requirements when submitting 
requisitions through the Standard Base Supply System (SBSS) by the Military Standard 
Requisitioning and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP) number. These requisitions feed into 
the Equipment Requirements System (ERS), a web-based, automated tool used by the Air 
Force to provide Air Force wide visibility of wing requirements. The Air Force ERS uses 
the prioritization logic and links the user’s requisitions to the computed requirement to 
provide a suggested buy list for the MAJCOM review. The MAJCOMs can then modify 
the priority list and identify critical items. ERS then consolidates the MAJCOM lists for 
Air Force Materiel Command buy execution (AMC Instruction 20-101, 2005). Despite 
historical underfunding for Air Force SE, MAJCOMs initially feared CAM would not 
support their requirements, but so far, the MAJCOMs have been happy with the support 
received, according to a CAM official. For items that cost more than $250,000, ERS also 
prioritizes centralized support (that is, non-O&M funded) equipment for MAJCOM 
review. The MAJCOMs are able to view the prioritization lists, the buy lists, execution 
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data (commitments and obligations), and unfunded priority lists. CAM applies any cost 
savings from bulk buys and strategic contracts for purchases towards the purchase of the 
next item on the prioritization list with collaboration with the lead MAJCOM, which has 
helped build the trust between the CAM purchasing unit and the MAJCOMs. Central 
management ensures standardization, interoperability, configuration control for safety 
and engineering, and better maintenance support. New items, which are critical to 
operations or have high visibility, can be funded in the current execution year with cost 
savings or through reprioritization. Any new or modified requirements must first be 
approved by the GS-15 or O-6 at the MAJCOM, before being purchased by the CAM, to 
avoid working level requirement changes and the possibility of starting a new acquisition 
process. To be considered for funding, a valid requisition must exist in SBSS 
(Anonymous, personal communication, October 15, 2009). 
With SBSS, the units can access a list of centrally managed support 
equipment. To accommodate the movement from Investment to O&M, Budget Code “Y” 
is used for O&M-purchased support equipment. Budget Code “Y” funds are centrally 
managed by the CAM, but SE can still be purchased using a lower echelon units’ O&M 
funds to purchase such items. This was the initial worry of moving from investment to 
O&M funding, but Air Force officials know and have seen that units do not want to use 
their sparse O&M funds to purchase SE items, for which CAM had already planned and 
budgeted. The units are very cognizant of which items are budget code “Y” items 
because they do not want to use their own O&M funds for support equipment if it is not 
necessary (Anonymous, personal communication, October 15, 2009). 
Annually, the Air Logistics Centers (ALCs) consolidate MAJCOM 
requirements by NSN to maximize economy-of-scale acquisitions. The ALC procurement 
process maintains audit integrity by tracking procurement via MAJCOM, Program 
Element (PE), Element of Expense/Investment Code (EEIC), Unit/Organization, and final 
delivery destination throughout the acquisition cycle. Allowance standards provide unit 
authorizations for quantities of SE maintained on hand. The Air Force Equipment 
Management System (AFEMS) provides visibility and accountability via the Custodian 
Authorization, Custody Receipt Listing (CA/CRL). AFMC maintains configuration 
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control and engineering support for all centrally procured SE items. The MAJCOMs have 
overall responsibility for SET to include developing policies and procedures, establishing 
and managing SE prioritization efforts, PPBE responsibilities, and resolving contracting 
issues involving the ALCs and the item managers (AMC Instruction 20-101, 2005). 
For vehicles, MAJCOMs budget for their funding. Then, the O&M funds 
are transferred from the lower echelon units to the CAM for centralized purchasing. This 
arrangement does not include vehicle leasing, which is done at the unit level. CAM 
officials would like to see the funding and management of vehicles be centrally managed 
like support equipment. In addition to SE, CAM centrally manages the following 
categories of equipment: aerospace ground equipment, aircraft tools, aircrew flight, back 
shop repair, crypto logical, generators, material handling, missiles, night vision, 
propulsion, safety and rescue, telecommunications, test equipment, trainer, vehicles, and 
weapons (Anonymous, personal communication, October 15, 2009). 
Other than the guidance provided under PBD 703, CAM policy officials 
did not know whether any written policy had been given concerning support equipment 
management for the Air Force. The SET initiative was the foundation, followed by 
MAJCOM policies, such as the AMC Instruction 20-101 previously referenced. A CAM 
official stated the transition to CAM and change in funding was difficult because 
everyone’s mindset had to transform to a new way of conducting business, essentially 
changing the tone of the organization. The change of going from procurement dollars, 
which they had three years to spend, to O&M dollars with a one year life, changed 
spending plans, which affected the item managers, program managers, engineers, and 
even contractors. It was a steep learning curve; it took a long time for those using the new 
process to learn how to use the new business processes effectively. The impact on 
support organizations, such as contracting and financial management was not planned for 
either. To dampen the impact, Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO 
21) or lean events and training, were conducted to increase efficiency and adjust to the 
annual cycle time. The benefits of the shorter cycle time included greater responsiveness 
and getting the equipment required to the warfighter in a timelier manner by contracting 
the equipment while the funds were available, but before they expired. The first year was 
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“painful” and manually intensive with many questions and explaining between CAM and 
the MAJCOMs. The MAJCOMs have learned to trust the CAM and learn lessons on the 
new processes from the bottom up to the general officer level. A CAM official felt that 
changes have been beneficial, and that CAM greatly improved how support equipment 
requirements and funding are managed (Anonymous, personal communication, October 
15, 2009). 
D. SUMMARY 
This section analyzed the data previously presented by focusing on issues that 
affected the Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force. The issues are placed in two general 
categories, concerns about policy and guidance, and effective and ineffective practices. 
The former include concerns about centralization versus decentralization, definition 
clarity, decision making criteria, and funding; and the latter include centralized 
information technology and information flows. This analysis discusses how some 
services have attempted to address these problems. 
1. Concerns about Policy and Guidance 
This section discusses the concerns about policy and guidance in terms of 
centralization versus decentralization, definition clarity, decision-making criteria, and 
funding to discuss and address establishing goals of central management policies and 
avoiding confusion by clarifying definitions and decision-making tools. 
a. Centralization Versus Decentralization 
Central management is a form of control. Having control has its 
advantages and disadvantages to all parties involved. In general terms, some of the 
advantages of a centralized procurement system are better asset management, ensured 
quality and standards, and better accountability (Anonymous, 2009). Another advantage 
is “centralization of physical location capitalizes on economies of scale and preserves 
organizational integrity in operations” (King, 1983). Advantages of central management 
seem to benefit mostly the higher echelon or controlling unit, since it gives them control,  
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while the disadvantages seem to affect mostly the user unit or the lower echelon unit by 
reducing flexibility. The more control exerted at a higher level; the less flexibility 
available to those elements at the lower levels. 
Disadvantages could be longer procurement cycles, longer support cycles, 
and inefficiencies from central storage. For example, if the system is backed-up, requests 
and support cycles take longer than usual. Also, having a central location as the only 
place to go to procure a specific item could prove time consuming, especially if the 
requesting unit has to go through several layers of red tape to request that purchase. On 
the other hand, if the unit was allowed to make the purchase itself, it might be able to 
obtain a faster response with the result of obtaining the item needed even quicker. King 
(1983) states that, “In special cases, such as military deployment or location of fire 
stations, the need for rapid response to unexpected situations also dictates the need for 
physical decentralization.” 
Offsetting those advantages to the unit is the fact that they would not have 
the experience to facilitate the process of procuring such an item. The expertise might 
take some time to develop. When the Air Force implemented its Equipment 
Transformation Initiative, it encountered this problem; the MAJCOM staff encountered a 
significant learning curve as they familiarized themselves with the new processes of 
managing the funding of a set of equipment that they had not managed before. 
Centralization can also be a problem when it “separates the making of 
decisions from their environment” (King, 1983). This is similar to the example of afloat 
body armor, managed by NAVSEA, but the users of the body armor in theater may or 
may not know that NAVSEA should be contacted for spares and replacements. Thus, “if 
decisions are misguided owing to poor top-level understanding of the 
problem…centralization can be disadvantageous” (King, 1983). In fact, for these reasons, 
the Air Force chose to decentralize equipment. Recall that in the Air Force, the higher 
echelon command, HAF, felt that it was difficult to defend the POM because it did not 
project the MAJCOM’s operational needs and that the equipment purchases were not 
directly linked to the current warfighter prioritized needs. 
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Decentralization also has disadvantages, especially when it increases costs 
to the unit that has to perform the additional functions. The MAJCOMs were expected to 
process more funds, and in a shorter time frame, without additional manpower. At the 
time of transition, an adequate IT solution did not exist to help with the management of 
the new accounts. An Air Force official had stated that, in his opinion, the change was 
made too rapidly without enough planning, manpower, support, and procedures. Rapid 
changes and lack of sufficient planning and risk assessment often leads to unintended 
consequences. Thus, when considering policy changes, it is essential that the policy 
maker consider whether the benefits of control outweigh the costs to flexibility and 
responsiveness. 
b. Definition Clarity 
The FMR does not adequately describe or define the term “centrally 
managed,” In fact, Figure 4 shows the only definition that the FMR provides concerning 
centrally managed items. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Definition of Centralized Item Management and Asset Control (From DoD 
FMR 7000.14-R, Volume 2A, Chapter 1, 2008, p. 1–51). 
In essence, the definition states that an item is considered centrally 
managed if one manager has authority to manage and procure an item. The authority to 
manage is often delegated to lower level commands. This definition does not really state 
much; it is too general. The use of terms, such as “central supply system” and “DoD-wide 
or Service-wide acquisition and control system,” are supposed to be all-inclusive. Many 
of the items in question are exceptions or new items, which are often COTS or may not 
have already been designated as centrally managed. In addition, the FMR’s definition 
seems to say more about what the responsibilities of personnel who manage centralized  
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items are than what centralized items actually are. For instance, the second sentence 
elaborates on the functions of personnel, while the final sentence expounds on “asset 
control.” 
At least two of the services interviewed stated that central management is 
ill defined, and units at the lower echelons do not always understand what is meant by 
“centrally managed item” and “centrally managed program.” When different 
interpretations exist or there is a lack of information, confusion can result in problems. 
At the Navy BSO level, the term “central management” is defined 
differently depending on to which BSO activity personnel belong; central management is 
interpreted differently at NAVSEA versus NAVAIR. 
Part of the problem is that concept and definition of revolving funds is 
misunderstood and needs to be clarified, according to one administrator. Recall that the 
determination of whether an item can be categorized under DWCF is a second step in the 
DoD FMR decision tree that leads to the determination of whether an item is investment 
or expense. In the end, the question of whether an item is expense or investment is 
ultimately the question that needs to be answered. 
Similarly, in the Marine Corps, administrators felt it was necessary to 
define several terms that deal with centrally managed programs, such as “central item 
management,” “centrally procured items,” “centrally controlled items, “system unit cost,” 
and “program of record.” According to Marine Corps officials, these terms often lead to 
confusion. By providing a standard definition of these problematic terms on a Marine 
Corps-wide order, administrators hope to clear up that confusion. 
Clearly, a consensus is needed on what key terminology means. Without a 
clear understanding of what constitutes centrally managed items and related terms, 
personnel continue to be confounded. Mistakes, such as potential ADA violations, could 
continue to pose problems. Time continues to be wasted as personnel correct errors, and 
conduct research in an attempt to discover how to go about making a purchase for items, 
which are required by the warfighter. Thus, when considering policy changes,  
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the policy maker should ensure terms are clearly defined and consistently applied 
throughout the organization; otherwise, written policy may impede accurate decision 
making. 
c. Decision-making Criteria 
The Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force classify expense and investment 
items based on the DoD FMR criteria. One Navy official does not believe that the first 
question asked in the DoD FMR decision table (Chapter II, Table 1) is appropriate 
because most individuals do not understand the term “centrally managed/asset controlled 
item.” Due to definition and funding issues associated with centrally managed items, 
previously addressed in this chapter, the question of central management should not be 
the first question asked. Figure 5 is a variation of the DoD FMR decision table, 
previously shown in Table 1. This is a better way of classifying expense and investment 
items because the first decision is based on whether the item is a capital asset or related to 
the operation and maintenance of DoD without first confronting the misunderstood 
central management question. The layout and manner in which the questions are 




Figure 5.    Expense/Investment Classification (From: Candreva, Slide 18, 2009). 
Figure 6 shows another approach to deciding expense and investment 
items. This decision table was created by Robert Anthony, who served as DoD 
Comptroller in the mid 1960s. Anthony published the table in a Public Administration 
Review journal article in 1971 in which he defined investments as the acquisition of 
equipment and real property, such as ships, aircraft, and other capital equipment and 
construction of buildings or other facilities. He defined expenses as resources consumed 
in a given period of time (a month or a year) in operating an activity, including labor 
costs, materials consumed in use, and services received. Distinguishing between 
investment and expense items was difficult, even in 1971. Back then, operating managers 
preferred items to be classified as investments because they would not be related to 
current performance, which was associated with consumption. For a novice uninformed 
user, this decision diagram is easy to use. It begins with the question of whether the item 
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is a major end item. Of course, like the current DoD FMR decision table, if major end 
items are not defined, this could cause problems. As Figure 6 showed, the question of 
central management is not introduced until later. Additionally, Anthony’s decision 
diagram addresses the question of reparable assemblies and repair parts, which is 
important today when dealing with depot maintenance and DWCF. Even though the 
expense/investment threshold was only $1,000 per unit in 1971, the figure can easily be 
updated to the current threshold of $250,000. 
These two diagrams show alternatives to the current DoD FMR decision 
criteria for investment and expense items. In all three decision trees discussed here, the 
end result is the classification of an item as an expense or an investment item. When units 
have a requirement and either O&M or procurement funds available, these diagrams do 
not indicate which type of funds should be used to purchase their requirements. The main 
problem still remains the lack of a clear answer as to whether an item is centrally 
managed, which is not addressed by merely re-arranging the FMR’s decision tree. 
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Figure 6.    Investment Cost Decision Diagram (From: Anthony, 1971, p. 391). 
As far as determining which items should be centrally managed, the Navy, 
Marine Corps, and Air Force use different methods. In the Navy, NAVSUP, a program 
office, or FMB decides which items are centrally managed. In the Marine Corps, 
centrally managed items are determined by echelon II commands, such as Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command. In the Air Force, it is determined by AFMC. The key is 
communication and accessibility to service members, so that they can ascertain which 
items their respective service has designated as centrally managed. Thus, when 
considering policy changes, the policy maker should consider whether current decision-
making tools and criteria are adequate to enable accurate decision making. 
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d. Funding 
Major differences exist in dealing with procurement money versus dealing 
with O&M money. Procurement funds are available for obligation for three years while 
O&M funds must be obligated within one year. These are rules that pertain to fiscal law 
and must be followed (31 U.S.C.§ 1502(a) and 31 U.S.C.§ 1102). With O&M funds, a 
rush occurs at the end of the year to obligate all remaining funds. Sometimes funds are 
not wisely obligated because units must “get rid” of the balance. In essence, they seek to 
be 100% obligated by September 30 of that fiscal year. If a unit does not spend all the 
money allotted them that fiscal year, a belief exists that their budget will be cut by that 
amount the following year, the “use it or lose it” mentality. The three-year window for 
procurement is not as rushed. Further, procurement funds are tightly controlled because 
Congress appropriates these funds by specific line item. O&M funds are less tightly 
controlled because they are appropriated by broad mission areas. 
O&M funds are more flexible with respect to their purpose since they are 
appropriated by broad mission areas; procurement funds are more tightly controlled since 
they are appropriated by specific line item. On the other hand, the one-year obligation 
period for O&M makes it less flexible; the three-year obligation period for procurement 
is more flexible. If the policy objective is flexibility with respect to purpose, use O&M 
funds by choosing not to centrally manage the item. If the policy objective is control with 
respect to purpose, use procurement funds by centrally managing the item. The converse 
is true with respect to flexibility and control with respect to time; O&M is more tightly 
controlled and procurement is more flexible.  
2. Effective and Ineffective Practices 
This section discusses effective and ineffective practices regarding centralized 
information technology and information flow. It also shows the lack of interoperability 
between the numerous IT systems used and lack of a single source of information 
regarding centrally managed items in the Navy and Marine Corps in comparison with the 
enterprise IT solution and source of information used in the Air Force. 
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a. Centralized Information Technology 
The Navy and Marine Corps do not have an enterprise information 
technology solution to view, verify, update, and check which items are centrally 
managed. Some Navy financial managers use DoD EMALL, which is accessible to all 
DoD military and civilian employees. DoD EMALL identifies centrally managed items, 
but only for items with an assigned NSN. For new requirements and COTS items, DoD 
EMALL is not useful. Additionally, each user must apply and have a justification to gain 
access to DoD EMALL. Most Navy financial managers ascertain which items are 
centrally managed by networking with officials at NAVICP, but Navy financial managers 
do not use a standardized method or procedure. 
The Marine Corps has many IT programs to manage information about 
equipment; in the Marine Corps’ current logistics IT portfolio over 240 systems exist, 
which are not entirely interoperable either with each other or with other services and 
agencies. At the echelon II level, important systems, such as TFSMS, are used by Marine 
Corps Combat Development Command; Supported Activities Supply System (SASSY), 
Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management System (MIMMS), PC MIMMS, 
Asset Tracking, Logistics, and Supply System (ATLASS), which are used at all levels of 
command for logistics, maintenance, and supply management; and Standard Accounting, 
Budgeting, and Reporting System (SABRS), which is used by financial managers. 
Centrally managed items are identified by Stores Account Code (SAC) and financial 
information is shown in these systems. However, these systems do not all interface, often 
duplicate information, and do not include items that most frequently lead to confusion. 
The Marine Corps is developing an incremental implementation of COTS 
software called Global Combat Support System Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) to replace the 
logistics, supply, and maintenance systems and better interface in a shared data 
environment with other existing systems. GCSS-MC will be a portfolio of IT systems that 
supports the logistics elements of Command and Control (C2), Joint logistics 




Concepts and Programs, 2008). The Army (GCSS-AR) and Air Force (GCSS-AF) are 
already using service specific versions of GCSS. GCSS-AF interfaces with the Air 
Force’s Standard Base Supply System (SBSS). 
Before the Air Force decentralized, the concern was that an IT solution 
was needed for the change to a decentralized model to be effective, which ultimately 
delayed decentralization. SBSS was modified so that logisticians, supply personnel, and 
financial managers who use it could easily identify centrally managed items, which are 
purchased with O&M as items with a budget code of “Y.” With SBSS, the personnel who 
need to ascertain which items are centrally managed can do so with one enterprise 
system, which caters to personnel from different occupational specialties. Thus, when 
considering policy changes, the policy maker should consider whether current technology 
facilitates or impedes access to required information necessary for effective management 
and legal compliance. 
b. Information Flow 
In the Marine Corps, different organizations within the Marine Corps 
centrally manage different types of items, in essence, aligning functional expertise and 
management responsibility within these organizations to specific types of items at the 
echelon II level. In the Navy, each echelon II BSO has its own policy on centrally 
managed items, but no list or database exists or has been published to identify which 
items are centrally managed. These practices create information gaps at all levels, which 
lead to personnel making erroneous decisions on what type of funding to use to buy a 
centrally managed item. Other times, lack of proper information flow results in 
unnecessary man hours spent researching, networking, making numerous phone calls, 
and sending emails to ascertain what organization or person is the central manager for a 
specific item. 
Both Navy and Marine Corps budget officials have proposed compiling a 
database or list of centrally managed items and making the database accessible to those 
who need to know the information. The list would have to include which organization 
centrally manages the items. Both the Navy and Marine Corps have even considered 
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publishing the individual item manager’s name, yet this is problematic due to frequent 
job rotations and turnover, and the infrequency of updates to publications and databases. 
NAVICP has a list of who manages which COG codes, but the list is not accessible to 
budget officials or other organizations at the echelon II, outside of NAVICP. 
Another Navy budget official suggested hiring a contractor or having an 
intern compile a list of APA or MC APA items from P-485 COG codes and make a 
database or spreadsheet available on Program/Budget Information System (PBIS). 
Currently, the echelon II Navy budget official has been using the P-485 or finding 
answers by networking and by using the aid of officials at NAVSUP. When the Marine 
Corps hired a contractor to compile a list of centrally managed items, the task proved to 
be more laborious than initially thought. Some of the barriers were the overlap of 
information, the abundance of equipment used, and the various IT systems used at each 
echelon II command. 
Even if a list had been compiled, the problem was, once compiled, it 
would soon be obsolete with the addition of new centrally managed items and disposal of 
older items. Thus, when considering policy changes, the policy maker should consider 
how information should be shared and kept accurate. 
3. Conclusion 
This chapter identified and analyzed trends and common problems associated 
with centrally managed items based on the author’s research. Specifically, these are 
associated with centralization, defining “centrally managed,” decision-making criteria, 
funding, technical solutions, and information flows. 
These problems are usually present in combination. The options encountered in 
centralization vs. decentralization and procurement vs. O&M funding both deal with 
issues of control vs. flexibility and responsiveness; the shift to a more centralized model 
means more control at the top level and denotes the use of a particular color of funding, 
procurement. Problems encountered with inadequately written or lack of policy 
concerning definitions to key terminology and decision-making criteria impede accurate  
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decision-making. Finally, problems encountered with a lack of a proper technical solution 
and improper information flow also impede access to the required information, which is 
used to identify centrally managed items. 
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IV. POLICY, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. POLICY MAKING IN GENERAL 
Government does not make a policy for a particular issue in society until the 
public or the agency’s leadership deems the problem worthy of the attention and action of 
policymakers. Many issues are not addressed because too many problems exist for 
government to solve, a solution does not exist, or the solution is more costly than the 
problem. However, once an issue is on the agenda, it tends to remain on the agenda for 
long periods. For example, poverty in the United States has remained an important public 
issue, even though different administrations have differed in the amount of attention 
given to the problem. Most recently, the attacks of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 brought the public’s focus to the American government’s preparedness 
for disasters. These events highlighted problems in the government’s response to such 
crises that needed to be addressed and resolved (Peters, 2007). 
An issue is placed on the public agenda when a perception arises that something is 
wrong, and the problem can be resolved through public action. For example, when the 
Navy recently experienced a few ADA violations, the issue concerning the policy of 
centrally managed items was introduced to the agenda because of a problem: ADA 
violations. The Navy wants to be more proactive in examining the policy on centrally 
managed items to prevent problems associated with centrally managed items and future 
potential ADA violations. Without these occurring, the issue of centrally managed items 
may not have gained the attention of Navy leadership to investigate whether or not these 
infractions occurred because of policy. 
Many actions and issues must be considered in determining whether a problem 
becomes a part of an active, systemic, or institutional agenda. Problems do not move on 
or off an agenda by themselves; they must first be defined and constructed in a manner 
agreeable for political action. This requires an active policy entrepreneur to do the 
necessary labeling and political packaging to make an issue appear on the agenda. 
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First, the decision makers must consider whom the problem affects and to what 
extent. The more extreme the effects, the greater the likelihood the problem makes the 
agenda. After the September 11 attacks, the range of people affected by terrorism 
increased significantly and the extent of the problem changed dramatically. Additionally, 
an incident, such as a terrorist attack, which has high visibility, affects its placement on 
the agenda as an active issue (Peters, 2007). The same seems to have happened in the 
Navy after a few ADA violations associated with centrally managed items occurred; high 
visibility and problematic trends brought centrally managed items to the active agenda. 
Once an agenda is set, policy can be formulated. Policy formulation is examined 
on a situational basis. The first situation involves cases with sufficient information 
available and a generally accepted “theory of causation” (Peters, 2007, p. 69). In such 
cases, policy changes are mostly incremental in nature (Peters, 2007). Small or gradual 
changes occur from a known starting point. A prime example is the way that the 
budgetary process generally works. For existing programs, the starting point is assumed 
to be a base budget, and from that point, incremental additions, subtractions, or both are 
enacted on the program. Individual human behavior could also lead to a preference to an 
incremental approach. Not wanting to lose a strategic foothold on an issue, decision 
makers might shy away from large policy departures for fear of a lack of support or for 
fear of losing face (Kingdon, 2003). Bigger changes could potentially incur bigger risks, 
and for the most part, decision makers may be more willing just to play it safe. The Air 
Force’s decentralization effort under PBD 703 is a good example in which only a portion 
of centrally managed items were decentralized and converted to O&M. Recall that this 
effort would also serve as a test to see if it could possibly be applied to the rest of the 
services. Moreover, the decentralization of items, such as night vision goggles and 
HMWVV armored vehicles, was denied, since Congress was not willing to take the risk 
of losing control in those areas. 
Most policies have flaws and unintended consequences, but once discovered, the 
policy can be updated or measures can be taken to address these issues. Even though the 
current policy may not be perfect, people know how to work with it and its limitations. A 
drastic change from an existing policy involves significant risk. In this research, the Air 
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Force was initially willing to accept significant risk by completely changing business 
processes under elog21. Once other issues surfaced, they changed the policy again to 
mitigate the risk associated with the new decentralized policy. Not all organizations may 
be in a position to accept the risk of drastically changing a policy. Within DoD, policies 
exist which could ultimately lead to the loss of human lives, such as a policy decision not 
to provide up-armored vehicles to all units going into a war zone. The risks of a high 
number of casualties because of this decision would be unacceptable to those who hold 
DoD accountable; a possibility always exists that the end result may not be worth this 
risk. In the end, any change should weigh the benefit of the improved end state against 
the cost of change. Doing nothing may be an acceptable solution if the problems 
associated with the policies are not significant. 
Another model, which explains policy formulation, is the policy regime model 
(Wilson, 2000). Regimes are characterized by “mutually accepted decision-making 
procedures and agreed upon rules of action” (Wilson, 2000, p. 256). In addition, they 
tend to share principles, norms, and beliefs and are organized around specific issues 
(Wilson, 2000, p. 256). As such, they share a common vision of the way ahead, which 
serves in providing a basis for common policy formulation. The service components 
within the DoD seem to fit the regime model in the area of common principles. Each of 
the organizations within the DoD has its own subset of principles, but many of these are 
quite similar and differences are minimal. The Navy and Marine Corps team profess 
honor, courage, and commitment as their core values. The Army lives by the seven core 
values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. 
Finally, the Air Force espouses “integrity first,” “service before self,” and “excellence in 
all we do.” 
Despite similarities in common principles, each service has taken a different 
policy approach in dealing with centrally managed items to fill its own needs. The Air 
Force’s objective in its decentralization effort was mainly to increase the responsiveness 
to the warfighter by establishing an effective and efficient process that provided the 
necessary equipment in minimal time. The Navy is concerned with ADA violations and  
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sees the decentralization of accounts as a possible solution to this problem. The Marine 
Corps, in turn, is concerned with filling the knowledge gap by drafting an order to deal 
with centrally managed items. 
B. POLICY CHOICES WITH RESPECT TO CENTRALLY MANAGED 
ITEMS 
This next section summarizes the findings and provides recommendations to 
address the problems encountered by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force in their 
handling of centrally managed items. All services experienced various forms of 
unintended consequences, resulting from actions each of the services took to deal with 
issues relating to centralized management. 
1. Centralization Versus Decentralization 
a. Finding 
The Air Force believed that decentralizing accounts under the Equipment 
Transformation Initiative would ultimately favor the warfighter. HAF was willing to 
change drastically by giving control to MAJCOMs to be more flexible and responsive to 
the warfighter. In spite of good intentions, MAJCOM units experienced a significant 
learning curve, and as a result, items were taking longer than usual to put on contract. 
Due to unintended consequences from the dramatic shift of procurement funding to 
O&M, the Air Force changed their initial decentralized model to a more centralized 
model with the CAM. 
In the Navy and Marine Corps, central management designation authority 
has been delegated to lower echelons, which creates problems when central management 
designation is not communicated throughout the component. 
b. Recommendation 
For decentralization of procurement to work, it must be supported by 
education, information technology, and information flow. Adequate turnover and proper 
training needs to be conducted with personnel assuming the new accounts to reduce the 
steepness of the learning curve. If responsiveness is a goal and cycle time is shorter, 
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additional personnel to handle increased workloads should also be a serious 
consideration. The intent (flexibility and responsiveness versus control) of how a 
component centrally manages items should determine the level to which central 
management designation is delegated. 
2. Definition of Centrally Managed Items and Decision-making Criteria 
a. Finding 
The Navy and Marine Corps have experienced some confusion in dealing 
with the terminology associated with centrally managed items. Part of the problem is 
different interpretations exist of key terminology. A lack of information also exists within 
these services and within the DoD FMR concerning what a centrally managed item 
actually encompasses. Within the services, no central location exists, with different 
organizations within both services having their own systems, policies, and practices. 
Moreover, the DoD FMR expense and investment decision table can be 
used to identify an expense incorrectly as an investment, and vice versa, if the person 
using it does not understand the correct definition of the terms used in the table. Since 
confusion exists in the Navy and Marine Corps about which items are centrally managed, 
expense and investment items can easily be misidentified if the first question about the 
items is whether the item is centrally managed, which is how the current FMR decision 
table addresses this issue. 
The Navy uses the FMPM to determine expense versus investment 
criteria, but the FMPM does not have a decision table associated with it. The Air Force 
uses an investment cost decision diagram in AFI 65-601 to determine expense and 
investment items, which is much simpler than the FMR’s decision table. 
b. Recommendation 
Consensus needs to be reached within each service, if not at the DoD 
level, to define terminology associated with centrally managed items. Possible definitions 
of confusing terminology should be vetted through all functional stakeholder  
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organizations to reach a consensus. Once a consensus is reached, results should be 
published and disseminated to all organizations and personnel within each service dealing 
with centrally managed items to establish standardized policies and practices. 
The DoD FMR decision table should be clarified, or left as is, so that it 
can be left open to interpretation by each service. In either case, a decision table should 
be used by all organizations to identify expense, investment, and centrally managed 
items. An example of how the decision trees can be modified was presented, where the 
question regarding central management or control is asked in the second or third leg of 
the table or decision tree instead of the first leg. 
3. Funding 
a. Finding 
When the Air Force’s Equipment Transformation Initiative transferred 
$3.2B worth of individual assets from procurement to O&M, MAJCOMs had a difficult 
time adjusting to the reduced obligation cycle of one year. Units ended up with increased 
O&M budgets, but now had to spend it in one year instead of the three-year timeline for 
procurement funds. Manpower was not increased and contracting times to obligate funds 
took much longer than expected. 
From the interviews with Navy and Marine Corps officials, it was 
discovered that the problem is not about what is and is not centrally managed; instead, it 
concerns an item, and trying to determine how the item should be funded (procurement, 
modernization, or O&M). 
b. Recommendation 
Recommendations given under “Centralization vs. Decentralization” can 
be applied here. Additionally, the authors recommend an incremental phased 
decentralization process when changing funding. For example, a third to half of the 
accounts could be initially transferred, and then within a year, another third to half of the 
accounts can also be transferred, etc. This would make the transition less difficult and 
give personnel more time to learn, and more time to develop procedures and capacities. 
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4. Centralized Information Technology 
a. Finding 
Both the Navy and Marine Corps use many different IT systems to 
manage and find information about centrally managed items. No standardized enterprise 
technological tool or system is used. Therefore, access to information and visibility of 
assets is not equitable for all supply, logistics, and financial management personnel. A 
variety of systems and tools are used in both services. The systems used depend on the 
specialty area in which the user works. 
b. Recommendation 
The Marine Corps plans to stream line and consolidate supply and 
logistics functions with the development and implementation of GCSS-MC. Part of the 
GCSS-MC plan should address policies and practices concerning centrally managed 
items. The Navy should consider a technical solution to provide fleet-wide visibility of, 
and information concerning, centrally managed items, which should be linked to the 
existing supply IT, architecture. The technical solution should ideally have similar 
capabilities to the Air Force’s SBSS with regard to the management of centrally managed 
items. Thus, policy can be interpreted in different ways, but centrally managed items can 
be communicated and reported to higher echelons in a uniform way through a database or 
program. At the local level, units can manage items in their own way, but all report 
information in a standardized format. 
5. Information Flow 
a. Finding 
Within both the Navy and Marine Corps, each occupational specialty area 
and functional organization has its own practices and methods for managing and 
researching centrally managed items. Both services have various listings or databases of 
centrally managed items, which are not linked, resulting in inadequate lateral nor vertical 
sharing and dissemination of this information. Information with respect to centralized 
item management consists of various “pools” of information within organizations that 
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handle subsets of centrally managed items, or within each functional community, such as 
supply, logistics, and finance. Procedures for accessing the pools of information are non-
standard and not well known outside those limited communities, which has caused a great 
deal of frustration both in the higher and lower echelon levels of Navy and Marine Corps 
commands since it equates to significant amounts of effort expended in researching 
whether a certain item is centrally managed. Moreover, lack of proper information flow 
could lead to potential ADA violations when lower echelon units incorrectly apply their 
O&M funds to buy a centrally managed item that should be bought with procurement 
funds. 
b. Recommendation 
The Navy and Marine Corps should develop a system/database similar to 
the capabilities in SBSS concerning centrally managed items so that information is 
readily available to those who want to know what is centrally managed or ascertain who 
centrally manages specific groups or categories of items. 
In the interim before developing a system, an abridged version of the P-
485 listing can be used. Appendix B contains an example of the modified P-485 cog code 
listing, which could aid financial managers in identifying categories of centrally managed 
items and the organization, which manages the items. In this manner, if a new item is 
being reviewed, the user can pull up a listing like the one in Appendix B, find a category 
of similar items, and call the item manager to discover whether a particular item is 
centrally managed. The listing would have to be readily available to users on PBIS for 
easy access. 
Even though this information is in the P-485, financial managers do not 
commonly use the NAVSUP publications, and the P-485 contains several volumes. Cog 
codes are listed in Volume II of the P-485, which is a voluminous document (626 pages), 
with numerous cog codes in the 58 pages of Appendix 18 of the P-485. Thus, on the 
down side, a novice or undetermined user could easily be discouraged from finding the 
correct cog code without knowing where to look. 
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The solution to centrally managed items seems as simple as compiling a 
list; however, the Marine Corps hired a contractor who found it virtually impossible to 
compile a list because of the lack of information flow and numerous organizations that 
centrally manage items. If a list is compiled, a note or disclaimer should be added to 
communicate that the list is not all-inclusive. A schedule should also be set to update the 
database or list periodically. When this database or list is maintained within an enterprise 
IT solution, such as SBSS, it should include the majority of all the centrally managed 
items. 
C. LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
In conducting the research for this project, interview data were limited in scope 
due to time constraints. The complexity of the DoD and its components’ financial 
management systems rendered a comprehensive study impractical. Some key officials 
deeply involved in the Air Force change process have retired or moved to new positions 
in other organizations. Those officials involved in Navy budget and financial 
management operations, Marine Corps official budget and property management, and Air 
Force officials who currently work with centrally managed items were selected for 
interviews. Publications, instructions, orders, and government reports related to expense, 
investment, and centrally managed items were selected to provide better understanding of 
current policies. 
This study began with the Air Force and the policy decision it made in 2005, 
under PBD 703, to decentralize $3.2B worth of equipment. PBD 703 stated that an audit 
would be conducted by the end of FY2006 to assess if funds were being used correctly 
and for the appropriate items and that, the Air Force would brief OSD-Comptroller on its 
findings. It also said that based on the audit results, DoD would evaluate the continuation 
of the program and implementation by all services for FY2007. In this research, it was 
not possible to find a copy of the audit report. Thus, the authors are unsure if it actually 
occurred. Nonetheless, the program has not been implemented by any other service thus 
far. 
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In the analysis of the expense and investment decision-making trees, the focus 
was on decision making in terms of centrally managed items, and not decision making for 
expense and investment items. The pockets of organizations that centrally manage 
different items in the Navy and Marine Corps were identified but not mapped. The data 
used from these sources are not comprehensive. Analysis and findings were thus formed 
with a limited sample size of data. While these interviews aimed at those involved with 
budget, financial management, and centrally managed items at higher echelons, further 
interviews with a larger random sample size may produce broader results. 
Publications, instructions, orders, and government reports related to expense, 
investment, and centrally managed items were selected to provide better understanding of 
current policies. The data used from these sources are not all-inclusive. Analysis and 
findings were thus formed with a limited sample size of data. While these interviews 
were aimed at those involved with budget, financial management, and centrally managed 
items at higher echelons, further interviews with a larger random sample size may 
produce broader results. 
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Information Technology Solution 
This project focused on the policies and practices concerning centrally managed 
items. A technical solution is vital for implementing and executing policies and practices 
successfully and avoiding problems related to centrally managed items. The Air Force 
uses SBSS, which works well by giving supply, logistics, and financial management 
personnel access to the same information in one enterprise system. The Army technical 
solution is Standard Study Number-Line Item Number Automated Management and 
Integrating System (SLAMIS), which provides a central location for nonstandard items 
where these could be accounted for in the same way as standard items from acquisition to 
disposal of items (Everard, 2006). The Marine Corps is developing Global Combat 
Supply Support Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) to deliver integrated functionality across 
various functions including supply, maintenance, transportation, finance, engineering, 
health, and manpower systems through maximum use of COTS/GOTS (Commercial off-
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the-Shelf/Government off-the-Shelf) products and web technology (Love, 2004). The 
DoN may be able to learn and adopt lessons learned from these existing systems and 
determine what capabilities from the best system can be adopted by DoN in enterprise 
business architecture for centrally managed items. 
2. Broader Study of on Expense Versus Investment Criteria 
This research focused on decision-making criteria and definition clarity in terms 
of centrally managed items. A broader study on expense versus investment criteria, 
policies, guidance, and practices could be beneficial to see if the same problems and areas 
of concern arise regarding expense and investment items, or if the problems associated 
with centrally managed items can be mitigated. 
3. Map Central Management Organizations 
This research identified numerous organizations in the Navy and Marine Corps, 
which centrally managed certain items, but these organizations were not mapped. It may 
be beneficial to map these organizations to determine if an aggregate command should 
provide oversight for these pockets of centrally managed items to provide clarity on 
policy and guidance, promote best practices, and ensure information flow throughout the 
component. 
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APPENDIX A. SUMMARY OF AIR FORCE INVESTMENT 
REDUCTION REQUEST 
Summary of FY2006 Air Force Investment Reduction Request (From: USAF 
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APPENDIX B.  CENTRALLY MANAGED EQUIPMENT 
Centrally Managed Equipment (Even numbers 2, 4, 6, and 8 denote material is carried in Appropriation 
















Material consists of equipment normally used in storage and 
handling operations in and around warehouses, shipyards, 
industrial plants, airfields, magazines, depots, docks, terminals 
and aboard ships as follows: 
 
• Warehouse tractors, forklift trucks, platform trucks, 
pallet trucks, straddle-carrying trucks, mobile cranes, 
trailers, hand trucks, handcarts and pallet-type handlift 
trucks; 
• FSC 3930 items, FSC 3920 (manual hydraulic pallet 
trucks - MHE trailers only) and FSC 3950 (warehouse 
cranes only). 






The Civil Engineering 





Material consists of equipment, components and supporting 
items that are in a research and development stage; or these 
equipment and components for which budget and procurement 
requirements, quality control or assignment to use require 
continuing logistics, engineering, or fiscal administration and 
control at the department level. Equipment includes: 
 
• All automotive equipment including general and 
special purpose vehicles (commercial or tactical) 
designed and used on and off highways for the 
transportation of personnel, cargo, tools, equipment 
and for firefighting purposes 
• All construction equipment which is defined as 
mechanical equipment used in the construction and 
maintenance of roads, bridges, buildings, or other 
kinds of real property including cranes, both truck and 
crawler-mounted, road rollers, graders, tractors, 
scrapers, street sweepers, pumps, air compressors, rock 
crushing plants, concrete mixing plants, asphalt plants 
and all like equipment 
• All weight-handling equipment used ashore in lifting 
large units of material and in some instances 
transporting or loading such material (exclusive of 
material handling equipment) including such 
equipment as hoists (except those of the elevator 
type);cranes of the overhead, wall, pillow and jig type; 
cranes of the portal, tower and locomotive type; also 
cranes of gantry, semigrantry, or cantilever gantry type 
and derricks 
• All railroad equipment, such as locomotives and other 




Centrally Managed Equipment (Even numbers 2, 4, 6, and 8 denote material is carried in Appropriation 








• Chemical agent detector kits and refills afloat and 
ashore; material and appliances for defense ashore 
against chemical, biological and radiological warfare 
except instruments for detection and measurement of 
radioactivity 
• Public works and public utility type equipment and 
material, such as prefabricated structures; pontoons; 
accessories and propulsion units, floating dry-docks; 
mooring equipment and navigational marker buoys; 
knockdown fuel oil and water storage tanks; package 
boilers and generator sets; switchgear; transformers; 
commercial type refrigerator equipment; air 
conditioning units; elevators; escalators; field 
telephone systems; distillation and purification units 
and other water treatment systems; water-fuel 
separators; and petroleum production equipment 
 
Equipment does NOT include: 
 
• Automotive, construction, weight-handling railroad 
equipment of a special type that are designed, 
developed and constructed for any bureau, command 
or office to perform a service peculiar to the requiring 
agency, which is the sole user 
• Equipment which uses standard chassis and motor and 









The Cruise Missiles 





of identification is 
FEDLOG. 
• Surface and Submarine launched Tactical All-Up-
Rounds 
• Surface and Submarine launched non-Tactical All-Up-
Rounds 
• Capsules and canisters for cognizance symbol 2D 
items 
• Shipping containers for cognizance symbol 2D items 










Material consists of those items of expendable ordnance, 
generally classified as conventional ammunition, over which 
NAVAIR exercises technical control. Cog 2E items are 
primarily those items of conventional ammunition used on or 
launched by aircraft. Material included is as follows: 
 
• Bombs (all types except nuclear bombs), bomb 
components including fin assemblies, fuses, primer 
detonators, etc., and bomb details including lugs, 
plugs, tools, etc.; 
• Chaff for countermeasure systems and chaff 
dispensers; 
• 20 mm, 25 mm and 30 mm aircraft gun ammunition 
including cartridges and links; 
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Centrally Managed Equipment (Even numbers 2, 4, 6, and 8 denote material is carried in Appropriation 








• Rockets and components (air launched) including 
launchers, rocket motor clusters, fuses, warheads, 
propellant grain, igniters, inhibitors, fairings, cable 
assemblies and rocket motors Jet Assisted Take-Off 
(JATO); 
• Pyrotechnics under NAVAIR technical cognizance 
including aircraft parachute flares, decoy flares, 
aircraft illuminating signals, aircraft smoke signals, 
photo flash cartridges and location markers; 
• Military chemicals under NAVAIR technical 
cognizance including incendiary oil thickener, irritant 
agent dispensers, smoke tank aluminum spheres and 
filling units; 
• Cartridges and cartridge actuated devices, aircrew 
Escape Propulsion Systems including aircraft ejection 
seat catapults, ignition elements, impulse cartridges, 
and cartridges for fire extinguishers, parachute delays, 
safety belts and cutters; 
• Miscellaneous ammunition components and 
ammunition details including pallets, pallet adapters, 
pallet crates and shipping and storage containers 










Material consists of equipment, components, and supporting 
items in support of new construction or conversion, fleet 
modernization (FMP), fleet maintenance, Defense Security 
Assistance and other services and government agencies, as well 
as: 
 
• Items in a research and development stage; 
• Items of such technical complexity that engineering 
control decisions are required during production or 
prior to issue; 
• Items unstable in design; or  
• Items specifically assigned to the Naval Sea Systems 
Command. 
 
Excluded from cog 2F material are SPAWAR cog 2Z electronic 
equipment. Material included is as follows: 
 
• All shipboard radar equipment including air search, 
surface search, height finding, 
• three coordinate, radar displays, radar antennas, 
submarine radar; 
• Submarine periscopes including complete systems, 
major components and 
• containers; 
• All Navy sonar equipment including complete 
systems, major components, domes, 
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Centrally Managed Equipment (Even numbers 2, 4, 6, and 8 denote material is carried in Appropriation 








• hydrophones and transducers; 
• Naval Tactical Data Systems (NTDS); 
• Shipboard navigational systems including ship's 
inertial navigation systems, 
• gyrocompasses, Position Location and Reporting 
System (PLRS), NAVSAT, 
• OMEGA and LORAN Receivers; 
• Interior communication equipment, such as AN/SRC-
47,AN/SRC-48, AN/WIC, 
• amplifiers and recorder/reproducers; 
• Exterior communications, such as LAMPS Receivers, 
AN/SKR-4, AN/SRQ-4; 




• Tritium air monitors 
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